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MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONT
LEONARD P. STRICKMAN *
During the past two decades, the Constitution has played an increasingly
important role in the resolution of family law issues. This "constitutionaliza-
tion" of family law is in part a result of a perception that social institutions
have failed to preserve traditional normative family values in a mobile, techno-
logically advanced society.' An otherwise conservative Supreme Court has
contributed to these new developments with a burgeoning activism in the field
of family law, creating and giving substance to new civil rights and liberties in
an attempt to restore some of these traditional family values.' This article will
I Copyright 10 1981 by Boston College Law School.
Dean and Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The author would
like to acknowledge the able research assistance of Gary Buseck, Mark Nowak and David Lin-
sky, while students at Boston College Law School, in the preparation of this article. A particular
debt of gratitude is owed to Gregory Golazeski who provided extraordinary assistance at the
critical stages in the article's development.
I See D. RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD (1961); P. SLATER, THE PURSUIT OF
LONELINESS (1976). See generally T. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). For a
controversial contemporary analysis see C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE
FAMILY BESIEGED (1977) and THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN ACE OF
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS (1979).
Much of the judicial activity in this area has centered on procreation, children's and
parents' rights in child-parent-state relationships, and on the constitutional rights of members of
family units other than the traditional nuclear family. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671
(1980) (government funding of abortion); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(access to contraception); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (state-
imposed maternity leave); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (access to contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(use of contraceptives by married couples). See also Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 49
U.S.L.W. 4363 (Apr. 20, 1981); H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S.Ct 1164 (1981) (notice to parents of
minor's abortion decision); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (minor's abortion decision free
from parental interference); Parham.v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (civil commitment of minor by
parents); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (consent of spouse to
abortion decision); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension from school); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parental right to control education of minors for religious reasons);
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,.393 U.S. 503 (1969) (minors' right to express political views
in school); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency adjudication and commitment);
and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (living together); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extended families); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster families); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (consent to adoption, illegitimacy); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (recovery for
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examine the constitutional issues posed by the exercise of the rights of marriage
and divorce. 3
In the first section, the article will trace the development of equal protec-
tion and due process jurisprudence since the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury. This discussion will illustrate how the Supreme Court has evolved several
standards of review for equal protection analysis, from which it has derived
standards for assessing substantive due process claims. Within this analytical
framework of equal protection and substantive due process, the article will then
consider the constitutional aspects of marriage. In examining the notion of
marriage as a fundamental right and the state's role in marital concerns, the
article will consider the legitimacy of certain state-imposed prohibitions on
whom an individual may marry, treating prohibitions based on race, sex, in-
cest and affinity. In addition, the discussion will analyze the constitutional
ramifications of certain state-imposed requirements which restrict the choice of
whether to marry — wealth, age, health, and monogamy — as well as penalties
on marriage short of prohibition, such as the denial of government benefits.
The marriage section will conclude with a discussion of the evolving notion of
marital privacy, as developed by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
and its progeny.
The article will then turn to a consideration of the constitutional issues
surrounding divorce. In analyzing the concept of divorce as a fundamental
right, the discussion will point out the contrast between marriage and divorce
in the Court's developing treatment of family law issues — namely, that the
Supreme Court has not yet fully considered the constitutional limitations on
state-imposed requirements for divorce, as it has done for state-imposed limita-
tions on marriage. In this section, the article will review the concept of divorce
from the perspective of procedural access, substantive due process, and equal
protection. It will be suggested that the Court should apply a high-intermediate
standard of review to restrictions on divorce.
In addition to considering divorce as a fundamental right, the article will
discuss the post-divorce issues of custody, visitation rights, and child support.
With respect to child custody, the discussion will treat the legitimacy of con-
wrongful death); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (inheritance); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977) (inheritance); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (custody).
Other recent articles discuss the history of family law, trends in the area generally
and in specific matters, and extensions of current principles to new issues. The literature reviews
both state law and federal constitutional law issues. E.g. , Developments in the Law — The Constitu-
tion and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Becker &
Honig, Family Law, 1979 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 511; Riga, The Supreme Court, Marriage, and the
Family: Tradition or Transition?, 39 JUR. 325 (1979); Beck, Nontraditional Lifestyles and the Law, 17 J.
FAM. L. 685 (1978-79); Zainaldin, TheEmergence of a Modern American Family: Child Custody, Adop-
tion, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979); Gelfand, Authority and Autonomy:
The State, the Individual and the Family, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125 (1978); Garvey, Child, Parent,
State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769
(1978); Kinney, Legal Issues of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 514 (1977); Fami-
ly Law Symposium, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 659, 693, 709, 715, 723 (1976); Glendon, Marriage
and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663 (1976).
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sidering factors such as the best interests of the child, and the parents' gender,
race, religion or moral character. It will be suggested that constitutional issues
are present in almost every aspect of custody and visitation matters, and courts
must be aware of rights emanating from the first amendment, as well as the
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses. The article
will also explore the constitutional implications of child support determinations
under equal protection and due process analysis. Having suggested considera-
tions that the Court must address in reviewing divorce and post-divorce family
issues, the article will conclude with an examination of the problem of discrimi-
nation against the divorced.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
It is important to establish at the outset a consistent analytical model for
due process and equal protection within which consideration of substantive
family law issues may be undertaken. In many respects, one model can serve
both substantive due process and equal protection analyses. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has managed over the past three decades to blend these con-
ceptually distinct concepts. The Court has employed notions of "fundamental
rights" to invoke similar standards of review for both due process and equal
protection cases. 4
 Nevertheless, while it is possible to construct a model
employing uniform standards of review which may be applied to either due
process or equal protection claims, it remains critical for a deeper understand-
ing of these constitutional limitations to mark the subtle distinctions between
them.
A. The Development of Equal Protection
In theory, the equal protection clause places less embracing limits on
popular government than does the due process clause. The fourteenth amend-
There is much discussion in the literature of the Court's blend of due process and
equal protection. Some of the commentators contend that the equal protection clause has been
the Court's vehicle to strike down laws objectionable in substance without returning to a Lochner
era-type substantive due process. Others offer theoretical justification for the blend. See, e.g.,
Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrasting Methods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14
HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 529, 554-73 (1979); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on Equal
Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L. Riw, 383, 383-88 (1977); Redlich, A Black-Harlan Dialogue on
Due Process and Equal Protection: Overheard in Heaven and Dedicated to Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 20, 31-33, 38-46 (1975); Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223, 242-66 (1970); Karst &
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. Cr. REV. 39,
58, 59, 76-77 Sr n.131. See generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1116-93.
In addition to the discussion by commentators, several justices of the Court have criticized
the Court's selection of one doctrine in lieu of the other, as well as the expansion of the equal pro-
tection doctrine itself. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391-92, 395-96 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S: 632, 652-53 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 467 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissent-
ing); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1970) (Harlan, I, concurring); Shapiro v.
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ment's due process clause extended the protection individuals enjoyed against
arbitrary actions by the federal government to actions taken by the states. In
contrast, the equal protection clause introduced a new civil rights concept to
the constitution. The clause attempts to assure comparable treatment of per-
sons similarly situated. 5 The early cases interpreting the equal protection
clause properly ascribed to its framers the summary intent of assuring racial
equality before the law. 6
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court has in the contemporary
development of equal protection jurisprudence placed a very heavy burden on
government to justify racial classifications.' Such classifications will pass con-
stitutional challenge only if they are supported by "overriding" or "compel-
ling" governmental interests,a and if they adopt the least restrictive means9 for
the achievement of such interests. This classic statement of "strict judicial
scrutiny," has been extended by the Court to provide the standard of review
for "suspect"" classifications other than race as well."
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson distinguished equal protection from due process as follows:
Invocation of equal protection clause [unlike due process] does not disable
any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means
that prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact. . . . [S]tates 	 . .
must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants ex-
cept upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-72, 81 (1873); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
The equal protection concept contained in the fourteenth amendment, as applied to
racial discrimination, has been extended to the federal government by way of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). See generally Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977).
For cases bearing on racial classifications, see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 8-9 (1967); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 291, 299, 305 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 1),
8 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2784 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Loving
v, Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192.93, 196 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944).
9 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (least restrictive alternative).
t° Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
" See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (alienage); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372, 376 (1971) (alienage); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477.78, 480-81 &
n.12 (1954) (national origin); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640, 646-47 (1948) (national
origin).
The Court has flirted with several standards of equal protection in cases examining laws
classifying upon the basis of gender. At one time, four justices of the Court advocated strict
scrutiny in gender cases and treated gender as a suspect classification. Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (Brennan, J., announcing judgment of Court in a plurality opinion)
("classifications based upon sex . . are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to
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After flirting briefly with an activist employment of the equal protection
clause to strike down economic legislation during the latter part of the Lochner
due process era," the Court retreated to a lower level of scrutiny for non-
suspect classifications." In a number of cases, the Court reverted to the
Minimum scrutiny standard of review it had announced in 1911 in Lindsley v.
National Carbonic Gas Co. 14
1. The equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in
such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially ar-
bitrary.
Under the minimum rationality standard, statutes which did not effect suspect
classifications would be sustained if the court could conceive of any rational
strict judicial scrutiny"). Even those justices, however, have retreated from that position. Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99, 204 (1976)
(Brennan, J.) (substantial relation to important government objective).
In alienage classifications, the Court's purported adoption of strict scrutiny is seriously
called into question by Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72-75 (1979), and Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291, 294-97 (1978).
12 See, e.g., Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 561-63 (1931); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1928); Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493
(1927); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 516 (1926); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 551 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
336-38 (1921); Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421, 424-26 (1921); Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415-16 (1920); McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241
U.S. 79, 86-87 (1916). See text and notes at notes 40-49 infra.
' 3
 This standard of restraint is similar to that employed for due process review in
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See text and notes at notes 46-47 infra.
14
 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1963);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 488-89 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-67 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552, 556-64 (1947). The only minimum rationality equal protection case in which the
Court struck down a piece of economic legislation during the period between the Lochner era and
the Burger Court was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 467-69 (1957). The More case, however,
was expressly overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). Two recent ap-
plications of minimum rationality equal protection review upheld legislation struck down by
lower courts. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S.Ct. 715, 724-27 (1981) (upholding
ban of plastic milk containers); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S.Ct. 453,
458-61 (1980) (upholding withdrawal of windfall retirement benefits).
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basis on which the legislation might rest. The two-tier equal protection analysis
employed by the Court thus invoked strict scrutiny for suspect classifications,
and minimum rationality for non-suspect classifications.' 5
In 1942 the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny for the first time to an
equal protection case not involving a suspect classification. At issue in Skinner v.
Oklahonza 16 was a statute authorizing the sterilization of persons convicted more
than twice of "felonies involving moral turpitude." The statute exempted from
its coverage certain non-violent felonies, such as embezzlement. Rather than
addressing in due process terms the individual's arguable right not to be
sterilized for convictions of a crime, the court employed an equal protection
analysis. The state, it held, had established a classification distinguishing be-
tween larcenists and embezzlers. While this was surely a non-suspect classifica-
tion, the statute nonetheless had to satisfy the demanding requirements of strict
scrutiny because by authorizing sterilization the statute had impinged upon
"one of the basic civil rights of man." Consequently, the statute was found in
violation of the equal protection clause.
The Skinner decision was the watershed case in the Court's adoption of a
"fundamental interest" approach to equal protection. The term "fundamental
interest" refers to those personal interests which either do not qualify for in-
dependent protection under the due process clause as "fundamental rights,"
or whose relation to the due process clause has not been specifically addressed
by the Court.' 8 Nevertheless, the comparative abridgement of such funda-
" A fuller explanation of the two-tier approach is presented in Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther Newer Equal Protection].
16 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
" Id. at 541.
ze The Court has stated that the fundamental interest in voting in state elections quali-
fying for equal protection strict scrutiny does not merit independent due process protection. The
early decisions noted specifically that states need not conduct elections for local offices. The cases
merely held that when a state grants the franchise, it must do so even-handedly. Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
In contrast to the voting cases, other fundamental interest cases do not contain explicit
statements. The Court's reliance on equal protection analysis, though, is persuasive evidence
that the due process clause does not provide independent protection. In the seminal fundamental
interest case, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court, through Justice Douglas,
relied on the equal protection clause to strike down the statute. Id. at 538. Chief Justice Stone,
however, found a deprivation of liberty and offered the lack of procedural due process as an alter-
native basis for the decision. Id. at 543-45 (concurring opinion).
An even subtler distinction occurred in the penalty on interstate travel or migration
cases. Although the Court found interstate travel to be a fundamental interest protected by the
equal protection clause, the source of the interest was not specifically decided. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). One frequently discussed source is the due process clause.
Id. at 666-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (reviewing potential sources and concluding that due proc-
ess clause appropriate source); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 763-70 (1966) (Harlan, J„
concurring and dissenting) (reviewing sources). Conceivably, then, a due process right lurking in
the opinions was the ultimate basis for the holdings. The Court did not indicate whether such a
right would suffice in itself to justify the decisions. The Court's rejection of Justice Harlan's due
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mental interests activates strict scrutiny." After two decades of disuse, the
fundamental interest analysis of Skinner recently re-emerged. As currently used
by the Court, the analysis requires that the fundamental interest be "explicitly
or implicitly protected by the Constitution." 2° This approach has been
employed by the Court in equal protection cases bearing on the personal in-
terests in voting, 2 ' and interstate migration. 22
Against the backdrop of two-tier equal protection — minimum rationality
virtually guaranteeing judicial approval, and strict scrutiny virtually requiring
judicial invalidation of classifications under challenge — a more complex
response pattern has emerged from the Burger Court to equal protection
claims." The Supreme Court has employed the following intermediate stand-
ards of review in equal protection cases:
(1) Strict rationality. The Court has at times employed the language of
process approach implies that it would not be sufficient. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at
655 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" A sine qua non of a successful challenge under the equal protection clause, unlike one
under the due process clause, is that the challengers establish a classification which discriminates
between two groups. Early on, the Supreme Court discussed the difference between due process
and equal protection:
It may be that [the clauses] overlap, that a violation of one may involve at times
the violation of the other, but the spheres of the protection they offer are not coter-
minous. . . . The due process clause requires that every man shall have the pro-
tection of his day in court, and the benefit of the general law, „ . so that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society. . .
The [equal protection clause] was aimed at undue favor and individual or
class privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination . . . on the other. It
sought an equality of treatment of all persons, even though all enjoyed the protec-
tion of due process„ . . Class legislation, discriminating against some and favor-
ing others, is prohibited, but legislation],] . . if . it affects alike all persons
similarly situated, is not within the amendment.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-33 (1921) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A statute, therefore, may violate the due process clause even though it deprives
everyone equally of the right in question. It may violate the equal protection clause if it treats
similarly situated persons unequally, whether or not due process is also violated.
20
 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
21 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-37, 342 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 625-29, 633 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 665-69, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55, 561-62 (1964).
22 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-55, 261-62, 269 (1974);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334-35, 338-45 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
627, 629-31 & n.8, 634, 641-42 (1969) & 642 (Stewart, J., concurring). Accord, Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 406-09 (1975) (without explicitly discussing whether infringement on interstate
travel amounts to penalty, Court upheld durational residency requirement for obtaining a
divorce as "reasonably . . , justified" and distinguished Maricopa County, Dunn and Shapiro).
23 See Gunther Newer Equal Protection, supra note 15. The variegation of equal protection
standards was supported by Justice Marshall in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). While a majority of the Court has
refused to acknowledge explicitly intermediate review standards at variance with two-tier scru-
tiny, this article will identify those additional standards and assess the employment of both inter-
mediate and traditional standards in equal protection cases arising in the areas of marriage and
divorce.
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minimum rationality by requiring a statute to bear a rational relation to a
legitimate state interest, while placing the burden on the government to
demonstrate that the classification is a reasonable means to the articulated ac-
tual purpose of the legislation. 24 The challenger is thus relieved of the impossi-
ble burden of proving that the statute bears no rational relation to any number
of hypothetical governmental objectives. This approach seems to be employed
in cases where the Court can identify a classification" abridging an interest
24 See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (state recoupment statute); Jackson
v. Indiana, 4-06 U.S. 715 (1972) (striking down state commitment statute which treated criminal
defendants incompetent to stand trial more harshly than other types of feebleminded
individuals); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (custody hearing prior to terminating un-
married father's parental rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons).
The primary difference between minimum and strict rationality is the shift of the burden
of demonstrating the legitimacy of the governmental purpose (ends) and the rational relationship
of the classification (means). The telltale sign of the shift is the Court's refusal to imagine any con-
ceivable purpose to justify the classification. Instead, the government must articulate expressly its
end. Not only must the government articulate its purpose, but the legislative history must sup-
port the government's assertion. Concomitantly, the government must show that the classifica-
tion is rationally related to the articulated purpose. Professor Gunther's article also included in
this strict rationality category cases in which the classification must substantially further the pur-
pose with little tolerance for substantial over- and under-inclusiveness. Newer Equal Protection,
supra note 15, at 20-21, 23, 29, 33. As used in this article, such a tolerance is allowable under
minimum and strict rationality. When strict rationality review is applied to state legislation,
legislative history is often unavailable. Pinning down the government's articulated purpose,
then, becomes problematical because the Court has only statutory context to work with. As a
result, strict rationality is less demanding of state government defendants.
The Supreme Court Justices recently disagreed over the applicability of strict rationality.
In United States R. R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S.Ct, 453 (1980), Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, contended that the statutory entitlement to retirement benefits, a curtailment
of which was at issue, demanded that the government bear the burden of articulating a legitimate
purpose. He thought that the Court should be wary of post-hoc rationalizations and that the
classification was not rationally related to the purposes reflected in its legislative history. Id. at
463-66 (dissenting opinion). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, however, gave broad
deference to the government in assuming a legitimate purpose and held that the classification was
neither arbitrary nor irrational. Id, at 458-61. Even Justice Brennan, however, has agreed that in
purely economic legislation cases minimum rationality is the appropriate test. A few months after
Fritz, he wrote the opinion of the Court upholding Minnesota's law banning non-reusable plastic
milk containers, but not cardboard ones, despite a contrary conclusion by the state supreme
court. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S.Ct. 715 (1981).
25 The equal protection analysis which has emerged in recent years acknowledges four
types of classifications: suspect, quasi-suspect, disfavored, and nonsuspect. See Strickman, The
Tuition-Poor, the Public University, and Equal Protection, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 595, 610 & nn.83-86
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Strickman]. Wealth, for example, is a "traditionally disfavored"
classification. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). When wealth, or
more accurately indigency, is the basis of the classification, the Court applies strict rationality
even though no other basis exists for more than minimum rationality. See, e.g. , James v. Strange,
407 U.S. 128 (1972) (state recoupment statute). When an important or a fundamental interest is
infringed on by a disfavored classification, intermediate scrutiny results. See Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, supra (voting in state elections); Strickman, supra, at 610. See also text at notes
32-33 infra. In his lengthy dissenting opinion in the public school financing case, Justice Marshall
pointed out that the Court's approach to equal protection analysis belies the traditional suspect-
nonsuspect dichotomy. San Antonio Ind. School Dist, v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He observed that "James [v. Strange] and Reed can only be understood.
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which falls short of being "fundamental," but which may qualify, in the
Court's view, as important. 26
 It has been described by Professor Gunther as a
"new bite for the old equal protection." 27
(2) Low - intermediate scrutiny. The area of gender-based classifications has
produced an equal protection standard of review which may be identified as
low-intermediate scrutiny. The Court briefly flirted with the concept of gender
as a suspect classification," but in the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren29
 settled on a
standard which inquired whether the classification in question "serve[d] im-
portant governmental objectives and [was] substantially related to [the]
achievement of those objectives. "s 0
The Craig v. Boren standard differs from both minimum rationality and
strict scrutiny with respect to the ends and means tests to be applied. First, the
governmental interest must be more than merely "permissible" or
"legitimate" — it must be "important." Yet an "important" interest appar-
ently can be of lesser-magnitude than the "compelling" interests required to
satisfy strict scrutiny. Second, in requiring a "substantial" relationship of
as instances in which the particular indivious character of the classification [wealth and gender,
respectively} caused the Court to pause and scrutinize with more than traditional care the ra-
tionality of state discrimination." Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as an example of a strict rationality case. 411 U.S. at 106-08
(Marshall, J., dissenting). At that time, gender-based classifications were treated as disfavored.
Since then, however, Reed has been superseded by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), making
gender-based classifications quasi-suspect, Strickman, supra, at 610, and subject to low in-
termediate scrutiny. See text at notes 29-31 & 114 infra.
Age-based classifications are another type of disfavored classification and are accorded
strict rationality review. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Without regard to its classification status when employed by states, alienage is probably at most a
disfavored basis for classifications by the federal government. Compare Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Strickman, supra, at 620. Other groups which, when set apart by the
government, constitute a disfavored classification basis are illegitimates, see Lalli v. Lalii, 439
U.S. 259 (1978) (Court limited analysis to the governmental purpose as articulated in legislative
history and allows substantial over-inclusiveness), and criminal defendants, see Jackson v. In-
diana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
26 E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 44-55 (1973)
(education); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (liberty interest in avoiding unnecessary
commitment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (access to contraceptive devices); Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing and appellate review); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare).
Recently, Justice Brennan advocated the use of strict rationality in a case where a
statutorily-created entitlement (retirement benefits) was the important interest at issue. See
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S.Ct. 453, 463-66 (1980) (dissenting opinion).
The majority of the Court did not go along with his approach and applied minimum rationality
instead. See id. at 458-61.
27 Gunther, Newer Equal Protection, supra note 15, at 20.
26 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, Justices Douglas,
Brennan, White, and Marshall would have ruled that classifications based upon gender are "in-
herently suspect" and subject to strict scrutiny under the principles of equal protection embodied
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 688 (plurality opinion),
29 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
3G Id. at 197.
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means to ends, the Court was apparently adopting a test of underinclusiveness;
the Craig v. Boren standard allows on its face for overinclusive classifications. 3 '
(3) High-intermediate scrutiny. The early fundamental interest cases em-
ployed the rhetoric of strict scrutiny to review equal protection challenges." It
is arguable, however, that the government was allowed more latitude in defin-
ing its compelling interests than it would have been in supporting racial classifi-
cations." Perhaps reflecting a more honest reading of its prior cases, the Court
has of late seemed to retreat from the rhetoric of strict scrutiny in deciding fun-
damental interest cases. Thus, in Zablocki v. Redhai1, 34 the Court held that the
classification in issue could not be upheld unless it was supported by sufficient-
ly important state interests" and was closely tailored to effectuate only those in-
terests. 36
This standard might be fairly characterized as one whose rigor falls be-
tween low-intermediate and strict scrutiny. The talismanic requirement of a
"compelling" state interest, for example, is avoided. In addition, the "closely
tailored means" component seems to add a check on the overinclusiveness per-
mitted by the Craig u. Boren test, but falls short of the "least restrictive
means"" requirement of strict scrutiny.
B. Substantive Due Process Before 1965
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, legislation which
suffered from no procedural due process infirmities. was nonetheless frequently
struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of due process. Most of the
'' See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (the Court
used a standard of scrutiny allowing over-inclusive classifications). The Court has arguably
adopted analyses in some gender discrimination cases which incorporate an overinclusiveness
component into the Craig standard. See, e,g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 100 S.Ct.
1540 (1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
52 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942).
35 Compare Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686.87 (1973) (fundamental interests in
voting and interstate travel — challenged restrictions upheld because " 'necessary to promote
. . the orderly, accurate, and efficient administration of state and local elections' ") and
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 679-80 (1973) (fundamental interests in voting and interstate
travel — challenged restrictions pass constitutional muster because they "are supported by suffi-
ciently strong local interests") with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
29-31 (1971) (racial classification — affirming authority of district court to order busing to
achieve integration despite evidence showing that busing would substantially increase costs; see
431 F.2d 138, 143-44 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1970) (discussion of costs by the court of appeals below)).
Of course, Swann may be distinguished as a remedy case rather than a case testing the basic con-
stitutionality of a racial classification, but it seems clear that such classifications could not be
justified by cost savings considerations.
34 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See discussion in text at notes 125-35 infra.
35 434 U.S. at 388. The Court in Zablocki interchanged the phrase "legitimate and
substantial interests" with "sufficiently important interests." Id.
S6 Id.
" See note 9 supra.
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legislation which the Court invalidated during this period involved regulation
in the marketplace of products, services and labor." Yet judicial activism
under the due process clause also extended to legislation, whose neither
primary means nor ends could be fairly characterized as economic."
The famous case of Lochner v. New Yore° exemplifies the mode of analysis
employed by the Court during this period. The Lochner Court struck down a
statute which established a sixty-hour maximum work week for certain
employees. The New York statute in question, like all regulations of conduct,
was uncontestably a restriction on, or deprivation of, liberty. 4 ' The primary
question, therefore, was whether the deprivation of liberty affected by the New
York statute was undertaken without due process. 42
 The Supreme Court held
that the burden was on the state to establish that the challenged statute had, on
its face, a direct and substantial relation to a purpose approved by the Court as
proper under its subjective view of the police power." Although New York's
announced purpose of protecting public health was legitimately within its
police powers, the Court was'persuaded that the state had not demonstrated
sufficient directness or substantiality of the law's effect to withstand a due proc-
ess attack. 44
 The Court did not make clear whether it would provide a com-
parable level of protection for all deprivations of liberty, or whether there was
something unique about the identified liberty to contract which required
greater judicial deference. During the subsequent three decades, however, the
companion words "liberty" and "property" in the due process clause were in-
terpreted liberally by the Court. A heavy, often insuperable, burden was placed
upon the government to justify the deprivation of such constitutionally pro-
tected interests. 45
After a thirty year reign of such analysis, the Supreme Court began
displaying a reluctance to invalidate legislation on substantive due process
38 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928); Weaver v. Palmer
Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
" See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute which required all instruc-
tion in schools to be conducted in the English language invalidated). See also Seattle Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1925); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404 (1923).
40 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4 ' In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes noted that it had been well settled by the
Court that state constitutions and statutes may regulate life in ways that are restrictions or
deprivations of liberty. Holmes noted also Sunday laws, usury laws, the prohibition of lotteries,
and the general interference with liberty by school laws, the Post Office, and taxation. Id. at 75
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
42 The fourteenth amendment provides, inter alia, that no state "shall deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law." U.S. C0NsT. amend. XIV.
" 198 U.S. at 64. See also cases cited in note 38 supra.
44
 Id. at 57-58.
4' See, e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Adair v United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908). Accord, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (state statute upheld as satisfying
Lochner-type due process burden). See also cases cited in note 38 supra.
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grounds." The culmination of its new restraint came in the 1938 decision of
United States v. Carotene Products:" In Carolene Products, a federal statute pur-
portedly aimed at protecting consumers was challenged on due process
grounds. The Court announced that:
a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in
judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show
that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a ra-
tional basis.
. . [T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judg-
ment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators."
No longer, then, was the government required to meet unsurmountable
burdens of proof in order to justify the regulation of commercial conduct. Such
regulation was to be presumed constitutional unless the Court found it in-
conceivable that the legislation rested upon some rational basis.
The limitation of this "minimum rationality" standard to "regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions" left open the question
whether there were some deprivations of liberty or property which would, like
the deprivations found in Lochner, impose a greater burden of justification upon
government. That the Supreme Court struck down no legislation on substan-
tive due process grounds between Carotene Products and Griswold v. Connecticut"
in 1965 seemed to suggest that substantive due process had met its end.
46 The Supreme Court's abandonment of the Lochner approach has most often been
identified as beginning with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Nebbia upheld a New
York statute which fixed minimum and maximum milk prices.
47 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
48 Id. at 152 (footnote omitted).
49 381 U.S. 479 (1965). A forerunner to Griswold may have been Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), in which the Court struck down a section of the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Act of 1950 which prohibited the use of passports by members of organizations re-
quired to be registered under the Act. Id. at 501-02, 505. When leading members of the Com-
munist Party challenged the Secretary's revocation of their passports, id. at 503-04, the Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, as too broad and indiscriminate a restriction
on the liberty interest in traveling abroad protected by the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, id. at 505, 514. The Court noted that the statute was not the least drastic means of achiev-
ing the government's asserted goal, and was, in fact, only tenuously related to that goal. Id. at
512-14. The Court stressed that membership in the controlled organization was the sole criterion
for denial of a passport. Id. at 510. There were no procedural due process questions at issue. See
id. at 503 n.3.
Although the decision seems to be founded on substantive due process grounds, see id. at
504 n.4, the result apparently was influenced by the first amendment values involved. At one
point, the Court described the statute as infringing on a liberty interest closely related to values
protected by the first amendment. Id. at 517. In addition, the concurring opinions relied on the
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C. Substantive Due Process Since 1965
Substantive due process re-emerged as a viable constitutional claim in the
1965 case of Griswold v.. Connecticut," where the Supreme Court struck down a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Justice Douglas,
author of the Court's opinion, was apparently reluctant to confront the danger
— implicit in substantive due process jurisprudence — that the judiciary will
select only those values it subjectively deems as important to be worthy of
substantive due process protection. The opinion seeks to rationalize the
Court's decision as stemming from the incorporation of rights arising from
penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments" into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Focusing on the specific impact
the state's categorical prohibitions of contraceptive use had upon married
couples, the Court identified a protected zone of privacy which seemed to find
its roots more in the procedural protections of the third, fourth and fifth
amendments than in notions of substantive right." Significantly, however, the
Court cited two Lochner era substantive due process cases." In addition, the opin-
ions of five concurring justices54
 seemed to reflect the view that the due proc-
ess values being protected in the case were more substantive than procedural in
nature. Although the Court attempted to base its decision on procedural due
process grounds, it seems nevertheless to have reopened the door — to some
extent — to consideration of substantive due process claims.
While it is clear that the Griswold decision at least partially revived
substantive due process, the decision is not so clear as to the standard of review
to be applied in such cases. A more detailed picture of the new substantive due
process arose in the companion cases of Roe v. Wade" and Doe v. Bolton." where
they found anti-abortion statutes to be violative of due process. After identify-
ing a "fundamental right" to personal privacy which embraced the abortion
decision, the Roe Court stated:
Act's violations of the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments and the bill of attainder prohibi-
tion, id. at 518-19 (Black, J., concurring), and on the ties of the liberty to travel to the first
amendment and the privileges and immunities clause, id. at 519-21 (Douglas,,) ., concurring). In
Griswold itself, Justice Black rejected the idea that any case, including Apeheker, between the end of
the Lochner era and Griswold was based on substantive due process. 381 U.S. at 517 n.10 (Black,
J., dissenting).
5° 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Id. at 484-85.
$ 7 Id. at 484-86. Justice Douglas' discussion of the privacy issue culminates with the
question, "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for the
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?" Id, at 485.
" Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute prohibiting children from at-
tending private schools invalidated); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute pro-
hibiting schools from teaching foreign languages invalidated).
" Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan joined. 381 U.S. at 486. Justices Harlan, id. at 499, and White, id. at 502, also
wrote concurring opinions.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
S6 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
"compelling state interest," (citations omitted) and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."
Where "fundamental rights" are involved in a substantive due process claim,
then, a standard akin to the strict scrutiny of equal protection jurisprudence
will be applied by the Court. The principal authorities relied upon by the
Court in adopting this standard were equal protection cases involving fun-
damental interests," and first amendment cases involving the free exercise
clause."
Since Roe, the Supreme Court has applied standards of review other than
strict scrutiny to substantive due process cases. The equivalent of low-
intermediate equal protection scrutiny was extended to substantive due process
in a plurality opinion by Justice Powell in Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 6° Strik-
ing down a municipal ordinance prohibiting a living arrangement in which two
first cousins lived with their common grandmother, the plurality of four
recognized that some liberties — like those relating to family living ar-
rangements — were entitled to more than minimal scrutiny protection. Thus,
Justice Powell determined that the Court "must examine carefully the impor-
tance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation." 61 Employing an analysis akin to the
underinclusiveness test of its low-intermediate equal protection review, the
plurality concluded that the regulation had "but a tenuous relation" to the city's
asserted purposes. 62 The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, necessary to
create a majority, saw the principal interest at stake as a property interest
rather than an interest in family decision-making, and required the city to
demonstrate a "substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." 63 He did not, as Justice Powell had done, seem to impose on
the city any need to show a governmental interest which rose above "permissi-
ble" to "important."
It has thus become clear that the Court often employs the various stand-
ards of review derived from its equal protection cases in assessing substantive
due process claims. Yet it is more difficult to identify distinct intermediate
levels of review in substantive due process analyses than in equal protection. In
light of the preceding discussion of the development of both substantive due
57
 410 U.S. at 155 (1972) (citations omitted).
" Kramer v. Union Free School Dist, No, 15, 395 U .S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U .S. 479 (1965); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940)
" 431 U.S. 494 (1977),
61 Id. at 499 (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 500.
63 Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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process and equal protection analyses, this article will proceed to consider the
constitutional aspects of marriage and divorce.
II. MARRIAGE
At common law, the act of marriage was seen as the entry into a contract
between a man and a woman, imposing upon each individual duties to the
other defined by law." The marital contract differed from ordinary contracts in
that, in significant respects, it could not be varied by the parties. 65 The mar-
riage ceremony was deemed to confer a status upon the husband and wife. Not
only did the state define this status, but it also retained a significant continuing
interest in its maintenance. 66
 Today, the state's regulation of the incidents of
marriage remains significant. The exercise of the state's interest in determining
both who may enter an enforceable marriage contract and what legal rights and
responsibilities are conferred upon those who have achieved marital status,
raises issues of constitutional dimensions. This section will explore the due pnic-
ess and equal protection claims such state regulation of marriage provokes.
A. Marital Choice as a Fundamental Right
If the personal interest in choosing whether or whom to marry can be
characterized as a fundamental right, then all laws restricting such choices
must be subjected to rigorous substantive due process review. The argument
that this interest is a fundamental right derives principally from an oft-cited,
albeit secondary, holding of the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia. 67
 Loving
considered a challenge to two Virginia statutes prohibiting any interracial mar-
riages to which a white person was a party." In the principal portion of its opin-
ion, the Court found the laws to create racial classifications violative of the
equal protection clause. 69
 But eight of the nine justices also explicitly found a
violation of due process." The Court declared:
61
 See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Department of Mental
Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal. App. 2d 24, 27, 54 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434-35 (1966); Morris v.
Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 549, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Jambrone v. David, 16
Ill. 2d 32, 34-35, 156 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1959); Powell v. Powell, 97 N.H. 301, 302, 86 A.2d 331,
332 (1952); Pashko v. Pashko, 45 Ohio Op. 498, 500, 101 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1951); Seuss v.
Schukat, 358 III. 27, 35, 192 N.E. 668, 671 (1934).
65 See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888); Buchholz v. Buchholz, 197
Neb. 180, 182, 248 N.W.2d 21, 22-23 (1976); Washington v. Washington, 486 S.W.2d 668, 669
(Mo. App. 1972); Gagnon v. Gagnon, 23 Conn. Supp. 368, 371, 183 A.2d 858, 860 (1962); In re
Campbell's Estate, 260 Wis. 625, 628, 51 N.W.2d 709, 711 (1952).
66 See Koerner v. N.J. Dept of Correction, 163 N.J. Super. 433, 436, 394 A.2d 1262,
1263 (1978); Wash. Statewide Org. of Stepparents v. Smith, 85 Wash.2d 564, 566-69, 536 P.2d
1202, 1205-06 (1975); Washington v. Washington, 486 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Mo. App. 1972); Haas
v. Haas, 227 Cal. App. 2d 615, 617, 38 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812-13 (1964); Pashko v. Pashko, 45
Ohio Op. 498, 500-01, 101 N.E.2d 804, 806-07 (1951).
67
 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
68 Id. at 2.
69 Id. at 7-12. See discussion of equal protection aspect of case in text at notes 88-94 in-
fra.
" Justice Stewart, the ninth justice, filed a two-sentence concurring opinion which did
not discuss the due process issue. See 388 U.S. at 13.
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These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental
to our very existence and survival (citations omitted). To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classification embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty
without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious
racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to
marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with the in-
dividual and cannot be infringed by the State."
The Court cited Maynard v. Hi/P 2 and Skinner v. Oklahoma," for the proposition
that marriage is a basic civil right of man, "fundamental to our very
existence." The citation of Maynard seems inapt since that case ruled that the
strength of the state's interest in regulating marriage overrode an asserted per-
sonal interest. 74 The citation of Skinner is also curious, since that case did not
directly involve the choice to marry. The reference to marriage as a "basic civil
right" of man, it seems, was really the barest dictum. 75 Nevertheless, the
above-cited language in Loving, not critical to the decision, has been alluded to
frequently by the Supreme Court and other federal courts in cases recognizing
marriage as a right which warrants substantive due process protection, 76 and as
a fundamental interest warranting heightened equal protection scrutiny."
While Loving remains cited for the proposition that marriage is a funda-
mental right, the continued validity of the Supreme Court's 1879 opinion of
Reynolds v. United States" raises questions as to how zealously the Court will pro-
" Id. at 12.
72 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
73 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
14 In Maynard v. Hill, the Court upheld a territorial statute dissolving the marriage of
the appellants' parents and cited the continuing interest of the state in the purity of the institution
of marriage. 125 U.S. 190, 192, 211 (1888).
" See 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). At issue in Skinner was the forced sterilization of certain
criminals. Id. at 536. See discussion in text at notes 16-17 supra and 110-11 infra.
16 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392-93 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Carey
v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 374, 376 (1971); Southwestern Community Action Council, Inc. v. Community
Servs. Adm., 462 F.Supp. 289, 296 (S.D. W. Va. 1978). See generally Developments, supra note 3, at
1248-56.
7 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F.Supp. 1210,
1214 (D. Conn. 1975).
78 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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tect that right under certain circumstances. In Reynolds, the Court sustained the
territory of Utah's criminal bigamy statute. The statute had been challenged as
a violation of the first amendment's free exercise of religion clause, and as a
violation of due process." The Court seemed to apply a single standard of
review to both issues, and presumed that the statute was valid on its face. 8°
While the Court never explicitly identified the standard if applied, it did ex-
amine at useful length the Government's asserted justification for its prohibi-
tion of polygamy, stating:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mor-
mon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic
and of African people. At common law the second marriage was
always void. . . .
. . . [T]here never has been a time in any State of the Union
when polygamy has not been an offense against society, cognizable
by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity. • .
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is never-
theless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually
regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of
its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties,
with which government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, ac-
cording as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do
we find the principles on which the government of the people, to a
greater or lesser extent, rests . .81
The legitimacy of the government's interest in discouraging bigamy seems
based in part on the Court's recognition that the monogamous or polygamous
character of the country has a profound impact on society. Since the govern-
ment's view that monogamy was to be preferred over polygamy was shared by
many other legal systems, the Court ruled that it must be a sufficient assertion
of public morality. The individual's right to marry — fundamental or not —
must yield to such an assertion. Reynolds, therefore, is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with Loving. It can be argued that the Reynolds Court recognized the funda-
mentality of the defendant's right to marital choice, and, applying strict
scrutiny, found the government's justification to be a compelling state interest.
The opposite result reached by the Loving Court can be explained in two ways.
The Court may have found that the control of inter-racial marriages was not as
important to Virginia's social structure as the control of bigamy was to Utah's
culture. Or, it could be said that Virginia's perception of the moral desirability
of white supremacy was not widely enough shared by comparable legal
systems82 to warrant presumptive judicial respect as an assertion of public
" See id. at 146, 152, 162.
" See id. at 166-67.
81 Id. at 164-66 (citation omitted).
82 Comparable legal systems include northern and western nations and every state in
the union. Western Europe qualifies, but Asia and Africa do not.
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morality. The latter distinction would seem more persuasive. Nevertheless,
salient objections can be raised to a theory which allows the judiciary to rule on
the constitutionality of statutes based upon a computation of how widely com-
parable legal systems share the policy or moral premise of the legislation."
Of course, Reynolds may also be distinguished from Loving on the grounds
that marital choice is fundamental only for the unmarried. Under such a view
the Reynolds Court's meanderings about the widespread subscription to
monogamy by western legal systems only served to provide a classical
minimum rationality for the Utah prohibition.
Apart from the Loving-Reynolds mode of analysis, there exists an alter-
native theoretical route to the conclusion that marriage is a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court has made rhetorical gestures at extending the fundamen-
tal right of marital privacy identified in Griswold v. Connecticut84 to a right of
marital choice as a function of the right to privacy." On its face, Griswold ex-
tended privacy rights only to those who had already achieved married status. 86
Nevertheless, as the meaning of constitutional privacy has expanded to include
a right to be free from governmental interference in important personal
decision-making," Griswold would seem to offer more support to the assertion
of a right to marital choice as a function of such privacy.
B. Prohibitions on Choosing Whom to Marry
Since judicial authority would seem to leave in doubt the existence of a
fundamental right to marry assertable by the individual as a function of
substantive due process, litigants have more frequently attacked state restric-
tions on marital choice as denials of equal protection of law. While the interest
in marital choice has been recognized as substantial, it has not been held, in
itself, to activate strict scrutiny review. Generally speaking, the standard of
judicial review accorded to laws affecting marital decisions will depend upon
the character of the statute's classification, rather than the nature of the right
affected.
83
 It should be noted that in dealing with restrictions on a woman's liberty to elect an
abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court, explicitly applying a "compelling in-
terest" standard, id. at 155, failed to canvass prevailing policy in comparable legal systems in
evaluating Texas' asserted moral interest in protecting pre-natal life before the point of viability.
See id. at 150-52. It can only be assumed that if Texas demonstrated that its moral perceptions
were widely shared by comparable legal systems it would not have been sufficient to defeat the
plaintiff's fundamental right. Reconciling Reynolds, Loving, and Roe, one might conclude that
while a "basic civil right of man," marital choice is not so fundamental as to require judicial
scrutiny at the same level of rigor as a woman's liberty to control her body, but that it is substan-
tially greater than an ordinary liberty interest reviewed under a minimum rationality standard.
84
 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
" See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384.85 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs.
Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(Powell, J., announcing judgment of Court in plurality opinion); Cleveland Ed. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66
(1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
86 See 381 U.S. at 485-86.
87 See cases cited at note 85 supra.
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1. Race
In light of Loving v. Virginia," which struck down Virginia's criminal mis-
cegenation statutes as violative of equal protection, 89 it may be concluded
categorically that restrictions on marital choice based explicitly on race are un-
constitutional. The Loving Court ruled that Virginia's proscription of only
those interracial marriages which involved "white" persons was consistent
with the state's legal history of adopting a policy of white supremacy. 90 This
finding was reinforced by an earlier Virginia state court decision in which the
court concluded "that the State's legitimate purposes were 'to preserve the
racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent . . 'the obliteration of racial
pride.' " 91 The Supreme Court rejected the state's argument that the equal ap-
plicability of the statutes' prohibitions to whites and blacks removed the legisla-
tion from the category of presumptive invidious discrimination." The Court
found that but for their race, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Loving would have been
criminally liable for the act of marriage." Thus, the statute created racial
classifications, despite its applicability to both whites and blacks. Having iden-
tified a penalizing racial classification, the Court went on to apply strict
scrutiny to the statute in question:
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand
on their own justification as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy. We have consistently denied the constitutionality of
measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race.
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause."
Explicit racial classifications infringing upon the right to marry, then, are
clearly violations of equal protection. The question remains, however, as to
what standard of review the court would apply to a statute affecting marital
choice which, while neutral on its face, had a racially disproportionate impact.
The Supreme Court decisions in Washington v. Davis95 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 96 concluded that racially
disproportionate impact, absent a showing of discriminatory purpose, is insuf-
58 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
59 Id. at 11-12.
9° Id. at 7.
91 Id. at 7. (quoting Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 89, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955)).
95 Id. at 8-10.
93 See id. at 11.
54 Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
93 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
96 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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ficient grounds for treating operative public policy as a racial classification for
equal protection purposes. 97 The Arlington Heights Court suggested that even
racial motivation will not activate strict scrutiny if the government can
establish that the facially neutral statute would have been employed, even ab-
sent its racial motivation. 98 The burden on a party asserting a racial classifica-
tion will thus often be insuperable. Consequently, a statutory wealth qualifica-
tion for marriage, neutral on its face but having a greater impact on blacks
than whites, could probably avoid the highest level of scrutiny. 99
2. Sex
At common law, marriage was defined as a contract between a man and a
woman. 10' Today marriage is controlled by statute in virtually all American
jurisdictions, and not every statute explicitly limits the marriage contract to
heterosexual unions. In spite of this omission, every state judiciary which has
been called on to decide the question has restricted marriage to parties of op-
posite sex."' The Supreme Court has chosen not to confront the question
whether a prohibition of marriage between members of the same sex denies
equal protection of the law.'" Cases the Court has decided bearing on the
resolution of this question, however, cast.considerable doubt on the correctness
of the lower court decisions which have sustained the prohibition.
The standard of review for classifications on the basis of sex has been sub-
ject to evolutionary development since the Supreme Court first struck down a
sex-based classification in 1971. 103 The present standard of review, as stated by
the Court in Craig v. Boren,'" is as follows: "[C]lassifications by gender must
97 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. at 264-65.
98 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. at
270 n.21.
99 For example, a racially disproportionate impact might have been provable in
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See discussion in text at notes 125-35 infra.
L°° See, e.g., Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 549, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 118, 131 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1956); Seuss v. Schukat,
358 111. 27, 35, 192 N.E. 668, 671 (1934); State v. Bittick, 103 Mo. 183, 191, 15 S.W. 325, 327
(1891).
E°' See, e.g. , M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 83-84, 355 A.2d 204, 207-08, cert. denied,
71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 264, 522 P.2d 1187,
1197 (1974); B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 117, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716-17 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker y. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311, 191 N.W.2d
185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982,
984-85, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500-01 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See also Hatcher v. Hatcher, 265 Ark. 681,
696-97, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (1979) (Fogleman, J., concurring and dissenting); McConnell v.
Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55-56 (8th Cir. 1976) (construing Minnesota law); Adams v. Howerton,
486 F.Supp. 1119, 1122-24 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (construing Colorado law and federal immigration
law).
102 See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing, for want of substantial federal ques-
tion, appeal from 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
103 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
104 429 U.S. 190, (1976).
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serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 105 Applying this low-intermediate standard
of review, the Craig Court struck down Oklahoma's differential treatment of
males and females with respect to "beer drinking age." Given that freedom of
choice in marriage would appear no less weighty an interest than freedom to
consume beer, the ban on marriage between members of the same sex should
be accorded at least as rigorous a standard of review, provided such a ban
qualifies as a gender-based classification.
Some may agree that a statute prohibiting males from marrying males,
and females from marrying females is not discriminatory in the least since it
applies equally to all persons regardless of sex. It is here that Loving v.
Virginia 106 is instructive. The Loving Court rejected the argument that, because
the Virginia statute applied equally to blacks and whites there was no racial
classification present."' The Lovings would not have been subject to the pro-
hibition were he black or she white.'° 8 Similarly, a statute which prohibits
same-sex marriages for both men and women is nevertheless a gender-based
classification. But for a person's sex, marital union with any individual would
be lawful. Indeed, Loving could be characterized as equating classifications by
racial preference in marriage with classifications based more explicitly on race
— both classifications activating the same level of scrutiny. Accordingly, classi-
fications of sexual preference which prohibit same-sex marriages warrant the
same standard of review that explicit gender classifications receive.
Assuming, however, that a restriction on marital choice based on sexual
preference does warrant low-intermediate scrutiny, the success of challenging
state prohibitions on same-sex marriage remains problematical. The constitu-
tional violation would have to outweigh asserted state interests of encouraging
child-rearing families and promoting public morality. State assertions of an in-
terest in encouraging child-rearing families would assuredly not survive in-
termediate scrutiny. Prohibitions on same-sex marriage would be substantially
underinclusive, since heterosexual marriages are also often childless, and over-
inclusive since same-sex marriages could proceed to build families through
adoption. However, a state interest cast in terms of promoting public morality,
would seem more likely to satisfy low-intermediate scrutiny. The objective test
implied in Reynolds v. United States, "9 which sought to assure that such restric-
tions are both widely imposed and morally rationalized by the legal systems of
the Union and the world, would seem to be met here. Whether or not one
believes subjectively that the prohibition on same-sex marriages has any rela-
tion to the public morality, the "important governmental objective" standard
of Craig nonetheless appears to be satisfied.
105 Id. at 197,
106 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See discussion of case in text at notes 88-94 supra.
107 388 U.S. at 8-10.
1°a
	
id. at 6, 11. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188, 191-92 (majority),
198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (1964) (striking down statute prohibiting interracial cohabitation).
' 09 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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Since prohibitions on same-sex marriages would appear to pass constitu-
tional muster under the Craig standard, challengers must pursue alternative
avenues of attack. One method would be to claim a fundamental interest in
marital choice which, irrespective of its lack of explicit constitutional founda-
tion, creates a right to strict scrutiny review when impinged upon by a sex-
based classification. This argument is partly rooted in Loving v. Virginia: if the
interest in marital choice qualifies as a fundamental right for due process pur-
poses, it surely must qualify as a fundamental interest for equal protection pur-
poses as well. The problem with basing a case on Loving's fundamental right
implications, as noted above, is that the significance of the Court's holding-on
that subject does not measure up to its rhetoric, and therefore would not seem
to demand a strict scrutiny standard of review for classifications impinging
upon the right to marry.
Skinner v. Oklahorna,"° a case cited in Loving and decided by the Court in
1942, contains language bearing more directly on the issue of whether a funda-
mental right to marry exists. In Skinner, the Court struck down, as a violation of
equal protection, a state law authorizing the sterilization of persons convicted
more than twice of "felonies involving moral turpitude" which excepted from
its scope offenses such as embezzlement. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, noted:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. . . . There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. . . . [S]trict
scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization
law is essential. . . "'
The undifferentiated mention of marriage and procreation in Skinner apparent-
ly later led the Loving Court to conclude each was a comparable interest in its
constitutional ramifications. If such a broad reading is correct, Skinner supports
strict scrutiny on prohibitions of same-sex marriage. It is submitted, however,
that Skinner should not be so read. Assuming the Skinner Court was correct in
proclaiming that procreation qualifies as a fundamental interest, it appears that
the irreversibility of sterilization accounted for review at a strict scrutiny level.
This quality of irreversibility is not apparent in sex-based restrictions on entry
into marriage. Thus, the urgency which caused the Skinner Court to apply strict
scrutiny is simply not present in cases involving sex-based limitations on mar-
riage.
Another argument for applying at least high-intermediate scrutiny to pro-
hibitions on same-sex marriage can be found in the 1978 Supreme Court case
of Zablocki v. Redhail." 2
 While scrupulously avoiding the "compelling" or
"° 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See discussion in text at notes 16-17 supra.
"' 316 U.S. at 541.
" 2
 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See text at notes 125-35 infra for a more detailed discussion of
this case. See also text at notes 32-37 for a discussion of the standard of review in Zablocki, supra.
July 1981]	 CONSTITUTION AND THE FAMILY	 957
"overriding" interest language of classical strict scrutiny, Justice Marshall's
opinion identifies the "right to marry" as fundamental for the purposes of
equal protection analysis only when it undergoes "significant" interference. 113
But the Court's application of a very high standard of scrutiny in Zablocki is not
dispositive of the issue, since the statute in Zablocki more significantly interfered
with the "right to marry" than do restrictions on same-sex marriages. In
Zablocki, a certain class of individuals was prohibited from marrying at all;
same-sex restrictions merely prevent certain individuals from marrying
members of another designated class. This may not be, in Justice Marshall's
language, a "significant" enough interference to warrant heightened scrutiny.
Despite the limitations on the applicability of the Zablocki holding, there is
Supreme Court authority suggesting that when quasi-suspect classification
such as sex, the use of which necessarily activates low-intermediate scrutiny, 114
impinges upon an interest having no independent constitutional status, but
with constitutional dimension, such as marriage, the legislation establishing
such a classification should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard." 5 If
the tendency of the Court to stack the weight of the interest onto the suspect-
ness of the classification to determine the equal protection standard of review is
maintained or expanded, prohibitions of same-sex marriages may be subjected
to strict scrutiny. The public morality argument, which can probably with-
stand attack under intermediate scrutiny, is unlikely to withstand strict
scrutiny. Such an argument, for example, has been dismissed by the Court as
insufficient to justify laws prohibiting abortion during the first two trimesters of
pregnancy." 6
In summary, although the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
prohibitions against same-sex marriages constitute equal protection violations,
the Court's decisions in related areas raise some questions as to whether lower
court decisions upholding such laws are correct. If examined under the low-
intermediate standard accorded to normal gender-based classifications, such
restrictions would probably be upheld. Challenges to the restrictions would
have a better chance of success if the right to marry were explicitly recognized
as fundamental for equal protection purposes, or if same-sex restrictions were
recognized as the type of "significant" interference with the right to marry
which led the Zablocki Court to impose high-intermediate scrutiny. In the event
See id. at 386-87.
14 Sec discussion of low intermediate scrutiny in text at notes 28-31 supra.
H 5 Several commentators have noted a stacking of interests theme in Supreme Court
opinions. Strickman, supra note 25, at 608 n,73, 610-13 & nn.84-86, 619-21 (1977); Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection — Education and Wealth, 7 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 105, 106
(1972); Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword; On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 36, 40 n.94 (1969) (speculating on "a piling on of fun-
damentalities" approach). Justice Marshall exhaustively reviewed Supreme Court precedent
that supports the stacking of interests approach in his dissent to the public school financing case,
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S, 1, 97-110, 121-22, 124-25 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
16 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 159, 162-64 (1973) (protecting prenatal life
— must be weighed against interests of mother).
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that such arguments fail, however, a successful challenge might be mounted
under the theory that the stacking of a quasi-suspect classification with a quasi-
fundamental right warrants heightened judicial scrutiny. Under such heightened
scrutiny, same-sex restrictions would likely be declared unconstitutional.
3. Incest and Affinity
Broadly considered, prohibitions on incestuous marriages concern men
and women related by blood or adoption.'" Statutes outlawing incest are vir-
tually universal in American jurisdictions. They vary only with respect to what
parties fall within the scope of the statute."' Prohibitions against marriages of
affinity, that is, marriages between two persons previously related in varying
degree by marriage, are less common in the United States. 19 Nevertheless,
both kinds of prohibitions raise constitutional questions.
The argument against incest prohibitions is most difficult to maintain,
when the prohibition is directed against members of the traditional nuclear
family. Such incestuous relationships have been so uniformly taboo and
unlawful throughout the nation and the world that, as assertions of the public
morality, they probably withstand the strictest scrutiny.'" It should be noted
in passing, however, that, whether challenged as a violation of due process or
equal protection, the state probably could not sustain its burden under even
low-intermediate scrutiny by arguing that eugenic considerations justify the in-
cest prohibition. The evidence appears to be too ambiguous to support such a
conclusion."' Similarly, the argument that incestuous marriage has a destruc-
tive impact on the development of the nuclear family is insufficiently verifiable
to serve as effectively as does the public morality argument in support of such
prohibitions.
Adoption is not universally a sufficient basis for defining incestuous marriage. See
Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 265-66, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (1978) (en banc); Bagnardi v. Hart-
nett, 81 Misc. 2d 323, 324-25, 366 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-91 (Sup. Ct. 1975). But most often it is con-
sidered to bring a relationship within the reach of the prohibition. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN.
5 93-1-1 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 14-178 (1969 and 1979 Cum. Supp.); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. tit. 1, 5 2.21(a)(1), (2), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-81); VA. CODE 20-38.1(a)(2) (Supp.
1980).
18 See Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Many, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 380
app. A. (1968) [hereinafter cited as Drinan]. Accord, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
$ 207(a)(2), (3) & Commissioners' Note. See generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1264-70.
"9 See Drinan, supra note 118, at 381 app. B., 382 app. C. Accord, UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT 5 207(a)(2), (3). In addition some states prohibit a marriage between a step-
child and a stepparent. Drinan, supra note 118, at 381 app. B., 382 app. C. See also CONN. GEN.
STAT. 46b-21 (1981); Contra, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 207(a)(2) (not pro-
hibited).
120 As pregnancy entered the third trimester, the Court in Roe v. Wade was willing to
acknowledge a compelling state interest in the protection of fetal life, essentially a moral concern.
410 U.S. at 163-64. The state's assertion of the public morality thus seems to take on more
"compelling" qualities as it comes closer to reflecting a universal moral consensus.
121 See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 71-72
(1968) (noting and rejecting eugenic justification for incest prohibitions) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK].
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Extending incest prohibitions to uncle-niece, aunt-nephew, first cousin,
and second cousin•relationships 122 may become increasingly more difficult to
justify as marital choice continues to be recognized as an interest of constitu-
tional dimension. Social interests of the state, even if sufficient to sustain prohi-
bitions on parent-child, grandparent-grandchild and brother-sister marriages,
would seem less weighty as the consanguinity widens. The public morality
argument, perhaps maintainable with regard to marriages between an aunt
and nephew or an uncle and niece, would have difficulty overcoming the wide-
spread permissibility of marriage between cousins.' 23
The application of incestuous marriage prohibitions to persons in adoptive
relationships certainly cannot rely upon eugenic support. It is arguable,
however, that the state interest in preserving stable family structures is as im-
portant in adoptive families as in biological families. If the courts are unwilling
to accept the stacking of social and moral interests, the public morality argu-
ment, standing alone, seems weak where the prohibition is not so clearly
universal. 124
'" See Drinan, supra note 118, at 380 app. A. (uncle-niece or aunt-nephew — universal
prohibition; first cousins — slight majority prohibits; second cousins — prohibited in
Oklahoma). Accord, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 207(a)(3) (prohibiting aunt-
nephew and uncle-niece; allowing first cousins) Sr Commissioners' Note (citing trend to allow
marriage between first cousins).
123 See Moore, A Defense of First-Cousin Marriage, 10 CLEV. MAR. L. REV. 136, 146-48
(1961).
' 24
 The statutes vary on explicit references to adopted relatives. Many explicitly include
adopted relatives of one degree of kinship or another. See, for example, the statutes of Mississippi,
North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia cited in note 117 supra. Other states take different ap-
proaches to the problem. In Washington, for example, the incestuous marriage statute does not
refer to adoption. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 26.04.020(2), (3) (1961). The recently recodified
criminal statute punishing incestuous sexual intercourse and seemingly including both marriage
and fornication, however, contains a separate definition subdivision which explicitly defines
"descendant" as including adopted children under eighteen years of age for the purposes of the
statute. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 9A.64.020(2) (1977). In Washington, therefore, although a
marriage between adopted lineal relatives may be legal, if the marriage is consummated, the cou-
ple has broken the law. In Massachusetts, although the incest statutes are not explicit, the adop-
tion statute is, at least for those willing to parse their way through its awkward structure. Compare
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, SS 1, 2 (Michie-Law. Co-op. 1969) (incestuous marriages defined;
no reference to adoption) and MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, 17 (Law. Co-op. 1980) (definition of
incestuous marital relationships applied to fornicative incest) with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, 6
(Michie-Law. Co-op. 1969) (adoption — effect of adoption is to make incest prohibition ap-
plicable to adoptive parent-adopted child relationship, but not to other new relationships created
by the adoption). Reading the Massachusetts statutes together, then, sexual intercourse or mar-
riage between a parent and an adopted child is incestuous. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act is partially explicit. It clearly prohibits marriage within a brother-sister relationship created
by adoption. 207(a)(2). It permits marriage within uncle-niece and aunt-nephew relationships
by adoption, even though analogous consanguineous relationships bar marriage. S 207(a)(3).
The Commissioners' Note to the incestuous marriage section relies on a morality argument to pro-
hibit brother-sister by adoption marriages, even though it acknowledges that no eugenic con-
siderations are present. The Uniform Act is ambiguous on the lineal relationships arising from
adoption. Such relationships are grouped with the brother-sister prohibition, but it is not clear
from the text of the Act or from the appended Note whether the "adoption" restriction applies
also to lineal telationships. See § 207(a)(2) & Commissioners' Note. In any event, the Supreme
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Affinity prohibitions on marriage would seem supported by a similar
social policy regarding stable family structure if applied to relationships be-
tween stepparents and stepchildren, and stepbrothers and stepsisters. More ex-
pansive affinity statutes would seem destined to fail as historic relics, since the
state lacks any interest substantial enough to meet low-intermediate scrutiny
standards.
Incest and affinity statutes, then, seem constitutionally secure where the
government's interest in promoting public morality is substantial. As the con-
sanguinity of the proscribed relationships widens, however, and public distaste
for the relationships declines, the public morality argument becomes less com-
pelling. In such circumstances, the legislation may be constitutionally infirm.
C. Prohibitions on Choosing Whether to Marry
The foregoing section addressed challenges to the state interest in denying
two persons, otherwise capable, joint access to the legal status of marriage. The
present section will address challenges to state assertions of interest in defining
legal incapacity of the individual to enter into any marriage. Once again, the
due process and equal protection clauses provide the principal bases of con-
stitutional challenge.
1. Wealth
The Supreme Court's decision in 1978 in Zablocki v. Redhail 125 confronted
for the first time the constitutionality of wealth qualifications for entry into the
marriage relationship. At issue was a Wisconsin statute which required any
state resident having minor children not in his custody whom he is under a
court order to support, to demonstrate compliance with that support obligation
and show that the children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to
become public charges," 126 as a condition of his being permitted to marry. The
Court found the statute violative of the equal protection clause. It should be
Court of Colorado, where the Uniform Act was adopted, recently struck down the explicit pro-
hibition in the brother-sister by adoption context. Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 762
(1978) (en bane).
In states where the incest or incestuous marriage statutes contain no explicit reference to
adoption, courts uniformly have construed the statutes not to prohibit marriage or sexual inter-
course where the relationship derives from adoption. Commonwealth v. Doe, 1979 Mass. App.
Ct. Adv. Sh. 1748, 1749 & n.2, 393 N.E.2d 426, 427 & n.3 (1979) (dictum); Bagnardi v, Hart-
nett, 81 Misc, 2d 323, 324-25, 366 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-91 (Sup. Ct. 1975); State v. Rogers, 260
N.C. 406, 409, 133 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1963); Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d
594, 600 (Ky. 1957) (dictum); State v. Lee, 196 Miss. 311, 314-15, 17 So.2d 277, 277-78 (1944);
Ohio v. Youst, 74 Ohio App. 381, 382-83, 59 N.E2d 167, 168 (1943); People v. Kaiser, 119
Cal. 456, 51 P. 702 (1897). The result in State v. Lee, however, was "reversed" by legislation.
See Miss. CODE ANN. 93-1-1 (1973). Further, the dictum in Commonwealth v. Doe seems to be
incorrect. As noted above, even though the incest statute is not explicit, the question is covered in
the adoption statute. Compare 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1748, 1749 & n.2, 393 N.E.2d 426,
427 & n.2 (1979) (with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, 6 (Michie-Law. Co-op. 1969).
125 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
L25 Id. at 375.
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noted that, unlike the restrictions based on race or gender, the restriction in
Zablocki impinged not only on the individual's choice of whom to marry, but also
upon his choice of whether to marry at all.
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court focused on the prohibitory
character of Wisconsin's policy. Notwithstanding a recognition of a "right to
marry [which] is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause," 1 " the Court did not find that
Wisconsin's statute violated due process. It did find, however, that the above-
mentioned nexus between due process rights and the interest in the choice to
marry, requires that a "significant" interference with that choice to marry ac-
tivate a very high level of scrutiny under the equal protection clause.' 28 In such
circumstances, the state must show more than that the classification constitutes
"reasonable regulation." It must demonstrate that the classification "is sup-
ported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effec-
tuate only those interests." 128
Justice Marshall did not feel compelled to indicate whether the preserva-
tion of support resources is a "sufficiently important state interest" to survive
equal protection scrutiny. Instead, he concluded that the classification was in
no event "closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."'" The test ap-
plied by the Court, then, apparently prohibits both overinclusive and under-
inclusive classifications. The Court found both conditions present since the
Wisconsin statute neither limited the financial commitments of the non-
custodial parent apart from marriage, nor took into account the possibility that
the new marriage might improve the non-custodial parent's financial
situation. 131
 Additionally, the Court canvassed alternative means the state had
for enforcing support obligations and found that these were "at least as effec-
tive as the instant statute's [means] and yet do not impinge upon the right to
marry. ,,132
It is interesting that the Zablocki Court chose not to rely upon those cases
that had previously applied heightened scrutiny where indigency had worked
an absolute deprivation of an important benefit provided by government.' 33
The individual's indigency was only deemed important in that it increased the
127 Id. at 384.
128
 Id. at 383, 386-88.
129 Id. at 388.
°° Id. at 388-90.
131
 Id. at 388-89.
132
 Id. at 389.
'33
	 Court had applied heightened scrutiny in a variety of indigency cases available
to the Zablocki majority. E.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (candidates' filing fees);
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (incarceration for those unable to pay fines); Williams v. Il-
linois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (extension of prison sentence beyond statutory maximum for those
unable to pay fines); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (assistance of counsel on first
appeal as of right from criminal conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (trial
transcript on appeal from criminal conviction). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (due process analysis — fee for access to divorce court).
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likelihood that the incapacity the statute inflicted might not be remediable.'"
In Zablocki the Court went no further than it felt it had to in order to in-
validate the statute. The standard of review, on its face more rigorous than the
low-intermediate scrutiny test of Craig u. Boren, fell substantially short of strict
scrutiny. The test presumably neither required the statute to serve a "compel-
ling" state interest nor be the least restrictive means of achieving a permissible
state objective.' 35
While Zablocki seemed to cast a heavy presumption of invalidity upon any
explicit wealth qualifications for marriage, it did not directly address standards
which would be employed in assessing de facto wealth discrimination
precluding the choice to marry. Such preclusion might arise, for example, from
a marriage license fee beyond the means of persons seeking to enter into a legal
marriage. The likelihood that few persons would in fact be precluded from
marriage by presently applicable license fees 136 may not be constitutionally
' 34 434 U.S. at 387, 389.
'" In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stressed that substantive due process was
the real tool used by the majority and urged the Court to recognize this fact. Id. at 391-92,
395-96. Under Justice Stewart's analysis, the Wisconsin statute violated the due process clause.
Id. at 392-95. Justice Powell, also concurring, found the statute objectionable under both the due
process and equal protection clauses. Id. at 400. Justice Powell, however, would not have invoked
as high a level of equal protection scrutiny as the Court did, id. at 396-99, but would have found
the classification so substantially underinclusive as not to meet the more lenient test employed for
gender-based classifications. Id. at 399-402.
' 36 At this writing, the fees ranged from $1.00 to $30.00. At the lower end of the range
are Arkansas and South Carolina. Oregon, with a state-wide minimum fee of $20.00 and a
potential local additional fee of up to $10.00, occupies the higher end. Figures for the states and the
District of Columbia follow. The figure listed is the minimum the applicant must pay to receive
an unexpedited license. The fees pay for a variety of services and some states recently have begun
collecting, or permitting governmental subdivisions to levy, an additional fee to fund reconcilia-
tion or battered spouse programs. Alabama $5.00, ALA. CODE 5 12-19-90(32) (1977); Alaska
(varies), ALASKA STAT. 5 25.05.241 (Sept. 1977) (delegating authority to set fee to state supreme
court); Arizona $8.00, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 11-554 (A.3.) (1977); Arkansas $1.00, ARK.
STAT. ANN. $ 55-202 (1971); California $10.00, CAL. GOv'T CODES 26840 (West Supp. 1980);
Colorado $7.00, COLO. REv. STAT. S 14-2-106 (1974); Connecticut $6.00, CONN. GEN. STAT.
S 7.73 (1979); Delaware $5.00, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 5 108 (1975); District of Columbia
$2.00, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. 5 15-717 (West Supp. 1970) (subject to modification by Superior
Court); Florida $20.00, FLA. STAT. ANN. 55 28.24(29) (110.00), 741.01(1) ($2.00), .01(2)
($5.00), .02 ($3.00) (West Supp. 1981), interpreted in Op. Att'y Gen. 079-96 (1979); Georgia
$10.00, GA. CODE ANN. 5 24.1716 (Supp. 1980); Hawaii $8.00, HAWAII REV. STAT. 5 572-5
(Supp. 1980); . Idaho $9.75, IDAHO CODE 5 31-3205 (Supp. 1980), contra, 5 32-408 (Supp. 1980)
($4.75); Illinois $15.00, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 53, 55 35 (1st and 2d class counties), 73 (3d class
counties) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); Indiana $5.00, IND. STAT. ANN. CODE ED. 55
31-1-1-3 ($3.00, marriage certificate fee, collected at issuance of license), 33-1-11-1(d) ($2.00)
(Burns 1980); Iowa $5.00, IOWA CODE ANN. S 606.15(28) (West Supp. 1980-1981); Kansas
$17.00, KAN. STAT. ANN. 55 23.108 ($10.00, registration fee, collected with application for
license), 28-171 ($7.00) (Supp. 1980); Kentucky $4.00, KY. REV. STAT. 55 142.010(1)(a),(2)
($3.50, license tax), 213.330 (50c., clerk's fee) (Supp. 1980); Louisiana $5.00, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. S 13:841 (West Supp. 1981); Maine $10.00, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, 5 2352(2)
(Supp. 1980-1981); Maryland $5.00, $6.00, $7.00, or $8.00, varies with residence of applicants
and with governmental subdivision issuing license, MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, 55 6 ($3.00 total,
composed of $1.00 application fee and $2.00 fee to county in which ceremony is to be
performed), 14 (issuance fee, $2.00 if one or both are Maryland residents; $3.00 if both are
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relevant to a facial challenge to such fees. In Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,'" the Court found that the state's imposition of a $1.50 poll tax in
state elections violated the equal protection clause.' 38
 The Court recognized
that "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned in the
Constitution'" 39
 and that the plaintiffs had not proven the existence of a
substantial class of otherwise eligible voters whose indigency precluded their
participation.Hu Nevertheless, the Court ruled: "To introduce wealth or pay-
ment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualification is to introduce a capricious
or irrelevant factor." 41 Although Harper could seem to be strong precedent for
arguing that marriage fees also add a "capricious or irrelevant factor" to the
exercise of a fundamental interest, such fees remain seemingly unassailable to-
residents of other states; $2.00 additional if license is issued in Baltimore City or any of ten
enumerated counties, regardless of residence of applicants) (1979); Massachusetts $4.00, MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 262, 5 34(42) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981) (unless modified by city or town);
Michigan $20.00 or $30.00 (residents and non-residents), MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 551.103
(MICH. STAT. ANN. 5 25.33(2) (Callaghan Supp. 1981)); Minnesota $15.00, MINN. STAT.
ANN. 5 517.08(lb.) (West Supp. 1981); Mississippi $6.00, MISS. CODE ANN. 55 25-7-13(3)(b)
($5.00), 41-57-48(5) ($1.00 recording fee, collected with application) (Supp. 1980); Missouri
$4.00, MO. ANN. STAT. 55 193.350 (Vernon Supp. 1981) ($1.00 recording fee, collected with
application), 451.150 (Vernon 1977) ($3.00); Montana $25.00, MONT. CODE ANN. 5 40-1-202
(1979), see also 5 40-2-405 (1979) (distributes $25.00 fee), contra, § 25-1-201(1)(m) (1979)
($15.00); Nebraska $5.00, REV. STAT. NEB. 5 33-126.05 (1978); Nevada $20.00, NEV. REV.
STAT. 5 122.060 (1979); New Hampshire $5.00, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 457:29 (Supp. 1979);
New Jersey $3.00, N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 37:1-12 (West 1968); New Mexico $6.50, N.M. STAT.
ANN. 55 14-8-10(B)(3) (1978) ($1.50, certificate and seal at recording), -12(A) (Supp. 1980)
($5.00, license and recording); New York $5.00 to $7.00 (New York City) or $2.00 to $4.00 (rest
of state), N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 55 14-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (up to $2.00, addi-
tional fee for couple's copy of certificate, collected from applicant), 15(3) (McKinney 1977)
($2.00, outside New York City), (4) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) ($5.00, New York City);
North Carolina $10.00, N.C. GEN. STAT. 161-10(2) (Supp. 1979); North Dakota $6.00, N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 14-03-22 (1971); Ohio $18.15, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 55 2101.16(A)(45)
(Baldwin 1978) (18.00), 3113.34 (Baldwin Supp. 1980) ($10.00, additional fee), 3705.23 (Baldwin
1976) (151t registration fee); Oklahoma $10.00, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, 5 31 (West Supp.
1980-1981); Oregon $20.00 to $30.00, OR. REV. STAT. 55 107.615(1) (up to $10.00, additional
fee), 205.320(7) ($20.00) (1979 Replacement Part); Pennsylvania $3.00, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
5 1-19 (Purdon 1965); Rhode Island $5.00, R.I. GEN. LAWS 15-2-9 (Supp. 1980); South
Carolina $1.00, S.C. CODE 5 20-1-230 (1977); South Dakota $10.00, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. 5 25-1-10 (Supp. 1980); Tennessee $4.00, TENN. CODE ANN. 55 8-21-701(14) (1980)
($1.00, clerk's fee), 53-461(f) (Supp. 1980) ($1.00, recording fee, collected with application),
67-4203(62) (1976) ($2.00, privilege tax); Texas $7.50, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
3930(7) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); Utah $5.00, UTAH CODE ANN. 5 21-2-2 (Supp. 1979); Ver-
mont $6.00, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, 5 1712(I) (Supp. 1980); Virginia $10.00, VA. CODE 55
14.1-112(b) (Supp. 1980) ($7.00, clerk's fee), 20-15 (1975) ($3.00, tax); Washington $8.00 to
$16.00, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 55 26.12.220(1) (up to $8.00, additional fee), 36.18.010 ($8.00)
(Supp. 1981); West Virginia $5.00, W. VA. CODE 5 59.1-10 (1966); Wisconsin $5.00, W1s.
STAT. ANN. 5 765.15 (West Special Pamphlet 1980); Wyoming $5.00, WYO. STAT. 5 18-3-
402(a)(xvi)(F) (Supp. 1980).
1 " 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
138
 Id. at 666.
139
 Id. at 665.
"° Id. at 668.
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day. The interest in voting — characterized by the Court as "preservative of
all rights" 142 may therefore be more "fundamental" for equal protection —
purposes than the interest in choosing whether to marry, which has been
characterized as "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." 143 There is little in Supreme Court rhetoric, however, to support such a
conclusion.
In theory, an argument advanced under a due process rationale, relying
on the Court's 1971 opinion in Boddie v. Corinecticut, 144 might be more successful
than an equal protection challenge in attacking licensing charges for marriage.
In Boddie, 145 the plaintiffs challenged the application of Connecticut's court fees
— averaging $60 in divorce actions — to a class of persons who could not af-
ford to pay them, and thus were effectively precluded from access to divorce. 146
In sustaining the challenge, the Court employed an analysis which combined
substantive and procedural due process considerations. The Court noted that
access to a divorce court "is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a
fundamental human relationship, hence the state holds a monopoly over the
divorce process.'" 47 While the same considerations of exclusivity are equally
applicable to marriage as to divorce, it is less likely that marriage license fees
preclude access to marriage for a large class of persons; the average marriage
license fee does not appear to be unduly prohibitive." 8 In addition, unlike the
equal protection attack undertaken in Harper, a due process challenge could not
be used to invalidate all marriage license fees because some indigent persons
are precluded from access. Indeed, Connecticut's divorce fees, in Boddie, were
invalid only as applied to those individuals who were denied access to divorce
as a result of the costs.
In summary, restrictions on the right to enter marriage that are based ex-
plicitly on wealth, and significantly interfere with the marital decision, are sub-
ject to high-intermediate scrutiny, under Zablocki. While constitutional chal-
lenges could also be raised against de facto forms of wealth discrimination, the
interest in choosing whether to marry does not seem to be significant enough
to warrant a complete bar to subtle forms of wealth discrimination such as mar-
riage license fees. In addition, due process challenges could presumably do no
more than eliminate the application of the fees to those who are unable to pay
them.
2. Age
Virtually all American jurisdictions place a minimum age on access to
marriage, typically 16 or 18, and often a somewhat higher age for marriage
142 See id, at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) and Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)).
1 " Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), quoted in text at note 111 supra.
1 " 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Justice Stewart relied on a due process argument in his concur-
ring opinion in Zabtoeki. 434 U.S. 374, 394 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
1 " See discussion of case in text at notes 217-25 infra.
"6 401 U.S. at 372-73.
1 " Id, at 383.
118 See note 136 supra.
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without parental consent. Such limitations derive, at least in part, from com-
mon law notions of marriage as a contract, and of the incapacity of minors to
contract."' To the extent that these age limitations are different for males and
females, they quite clearly are invalid as unconstitutional sex-based
discrimination. In 1975, in Stanton v. Stanton,'" the Supreme Court struck
down a Utah statute which provided different ages of majority for males and
females with regard to their right to child support. In so doing the Court made
clear that the burden on the state to justify a gender-based differential age of
majority for any purpose would be a heavy one — clearly too heavy to sustain
its use in determining capacity to marry.
Absent sex discrimination, any claim that a minimum age requirement for
marriage violates the constitution is likely to fail. The Supreme Court has re-
jected the argument that age is a suspect classification when made by a police
officer who reached compulsory retirement at age 50.' 5 ' While it has not chosen
to address claims of age discrimination against the young, it may be
hypothesized that, absent some additional factors, such classifications are
unlikely in themselves to qualify for any heightened level of scrutiny.
Of course, there is arguably more involved than age discrimination in a
restriction on the capacity to marry — i.e., a substantial, if not fundamental,
interest in marital choice. But the Supreme Court has shown a disinclination to
accord young people the same right of access to sexually explicit material as is
accorded to adults under the first amendment.' 5 2 Thus, it appears unlikely that
the Court will recognize in minors a constitutional interest in the choice to
marry to the same extent as in adults.
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized under due process the right of
minors to access to contraceptives, 15 " and the right of mature minors to choose
to abort a pregnancy. 154
 Granted, the delay of the right to marry is not as ir-
revocable a deprivation of a libety interest as is a delay in the right to exercise
an abortion decision; even absent a mature minor's independently protectable
due process right to marry, however, were the decision to marry be made by a
pregnant minor, the implication of a second fundamental interest might re-
quire the application of strict scrutiny review. Under such circumstances, it is
difficult to see how a state bar to marriage based on age could be sustained.
Unless age restrictions on marital choice implicate other fundamental in-
terests, then, they are unlikely to be declared constitutionally infirm. Age
199 See Developments, supra note 3, at 1257-59; Kingsley, The Law of Infants' Marriages, 9
VAND, L. REV. 593, 593-94 (1956); Note, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act — Marital Age Pro-
visions, 57 MINN. L. REV. 179, 187 n.41 (1972); Comment, The Underage Marriage and Parental
Consent Problems in Texas — A Look at the Past as well as the Present, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 332, 332
(1970). For the view of the common law treating marriage as a contract, see 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 433.
'" 421 U.S. 7 (1975), on appeal after remand, 552 P.2d 112 (1976), vacated and remanded, 429
U.S. 501 (1977).
15 ' Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
152 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
'" Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
154 H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S.Ct. 1164 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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classifications based on gender, however, are facially invalid under the reason-
ing of Stanton.
3. Health
In theory, mental incompetents are denied access to legal marriage. In
practice, however, the question of incompetency almost always arises after a
marriage has already taken place, in suits for annulment.'" As with incapacity
based on age, such state policies find their roots in the common law require-
ment of capacity to contract. As such, there is little doubt that the rules regard-
ing mental competency are constitutionally invulnerable, although should a
state attempt to invoke them as a grounds for denying a marriage license, it
would no doubt have to satisfy minimum requirements of procedural due proc-
ess.' 56
The more frequently invoked and more vulnerable limitations on mar-
riage involve physical health. Primary among these restrictions is the widely
applied requirement that an applicant for a marriage license produce certifica-
tion of freedom from venereal disease as a condition to the grant of the
license.'" Other less frequently imposed requirements include proof of free-
dom from tuberculosism and German measles. 159
'" See, e.g., Homan v. Homan, 181 Neb. 259, 147 N.W.2d 630 (1967); Larson v. Lar-
son, 42 II]. App. 2d 467, 192 N.E.2d 594 (1963); Mahan v. Mahan, 88 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1956);
Goldman v. Goldman, 169 Cal. App. 2d 103, 336 P.2d 952 (1959); Chapline v. Stone, 77 Mo.
App. 523 (1898).
"6 Under the calculus developed by the Court, the applicant threatened with denial of a
marriage license due to mental incompetency would probably be entitled to a hearing before
denial. See S. BREYER AND R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
672 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976). The applicant has a strong con-
stitutional interest in obtaining the license, see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978),
and mental incompetence seems to require a sufficiently difficult determination of fact that a
hearing would be necessary to ensure the legitimacy of the government's decision to deny a
license. Several cases have demonstrated the propriety of conducting such hearings in other situa-
tions involving allegations of incompetence. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972);
In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 393, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103-04 (1968). In addi-
tion, the state has a virtual monopoly on access to marriage and the considerations involved in
the access to divorce cases, involving a similar state monopoly, should apply equally to obtaining
a license. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79, 383 (1971).
One state, North Carolina, requires a statement by a physician, presumably the one per-
forming the venereal disease and tuberculosis tests required, stating that the applicant is mentally
competent. N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 51-9 (Michie Supp. 1979). If the applicant is found to be mental-
ly incompetent, the license generally will be issued only if the applicant submits to eugenic
sterilization. N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 51-12 (1976). The applicant's interests under such a statute
should be accorded at least as rigorous constitutional protection as an outright denial of a license
receives because the fundamental interest in procreation is penalized.
' 57 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 5 4300(a) (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT.
46b-26(a) (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. S 53-215 (Harrison Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT.
ANN, 5 23-301 (Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 51-9 (Michie Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. 5 26.04.210 (West Supp. 1981).
156 N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 51-9 (Michie Supp. 1979).
"9 CAL. CIV. CODE 5 4300(b) (West Supp. 1981). Several states require only that the
woman submit to a test for German measles (rubella) and that she be informed of the results and
the dangers of mixing rubella and pregnancy. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. S 46b-26(e) (West
Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. 5 53-217.1 (Harrison Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE 32-412 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980).
July 19811
	 CONSTITUTION AND THE FAMILY	 967
If the dicta of Zablocki v. Redhail' 6° are to be taken at face value, such re-
quirements of physical health are "reasonable regulations," invulnerable to
constitutional attack. The state's interest in promoting health certainly cannot
be minimized in view of Roe v. Wade's acknowledgement that the state's in-
terest in the public health is "compelling" enough to override fundamental
rights in requiring that second trimester abortions be performed in hospitals. 161
In addition, the disability imposed by the statute is temporary in nature,
presumably eradicated when the disease is cured. Nonetheless, it is submitted
that however temporary the disqualification, it cannot survive beyond the most
minimal scrutiny. The classification is vastly underinclusive in identifying,
although in part for its own edification, a miniscule part of the population
which may be in danger of communicating venereal disease; yet it is also
substantially overinclusive in its application to the portion of the marrying
population which has engaged in sexual intercourse before applying for a
license, and which may or may not be deterred from engaging in intercourse by
the denial of a license. The state objective of public health would seem so
minimally served as perhaps not to justify even the temporary disqualification
from marriage and the small invasion of personal privacy involved. 162
4. Polygamy
There is no reason to doubt that the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds
v. United States, 163 discussed earlier,'" remains good law. Thus, no substantive
constitutional challenge to monogamy requirements — whether under due
process, equal protection, or free exercise of religion rationales — would have
any plausible chance of success.
D. Penalties on Marriage Short of Prohibition
In distributing burdens and benefits, the government has often
distinguished between people occupying married status and the unmarried.
Married persons have often enjoyed greater benefits' 65 or have been spared
160
 434 U.S. 374, 386 (majority), 392 (Stewart, J., concurring) 396, 399 (Powell, J.,
concurring), 404 (Stevens, J., concurring) (1978).
' 6 ' 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). Accord, Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Orr,
496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. (1980)), No. 80-1275 (1981), 49 U.S.L.W. 3560 (filed), 3691
(sum), 3806 (aff'd).
' 62 Professor Clark approves the result of the one reported case, Peterson v. Widule, 157
Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914), upholding the constitutionality of a freedom from venereal
disease requirement. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 86 (1968).
' 63 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
164 See text at notes 78-81 supra.
' 63 There are numerous instances of greater benefits accorded married persons. Under
the Social Security Act and related legislation, married persons are entitled to receive benefits not
available to the unmarried. E.g., 42 U.S.C. $ 402(b), (c), (e), (f), (i) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Other examples of the greater benefits available to married persons are found in the Veterans'
Benefits laws. E.g. 38 U.S.C. $$ 315(1)(A), 1682(a)(I), (c)(2), (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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certain burdens.'" In such cases, it is difficult for the unmarried to argue, in
the absence of judicial identification of marital status as a suspect classification,
that they have a fundamental or otherwise protectible interest in remaining un-
married, the penalization of which should activate heightened judicial scrutiny.
One could make the case that if the interest in choosing to marry is protectible,
the liberty of choosing not to marry must be at least as protectible. Such an
argument perhaps highlights a problem with the fundamental interest ap-
proach to equal protection analysis. 167
A constitutional challenge is more easily made when the married are
denied benefits provided the unmarried, or saddled with burdens not imposed
upon the unmarried. In such instances, the argument can be advanced that the
classifications discourage marriage, and may therefore be tantamount, for at
least some, to prohibition. Such an argument was pursued unsuccessfully in
the 1977 case of Califano v. Jobst.'" In that case a recipient of Social Security
benefits claimed that the automatic cessation of benefits on the occasion of his
marriage was violative of his constitutional rights. In the wake of Jobst,
however, the law remains unclear on what standards apply to classifications
based on marital status — classifications which can be seriously discouraging
or prohibitive of the exercise of the choice to marry.
In Jobst, the plaintiff, a disabled adult, was considered a dependent child
recipient of Social Security benefits. As such, the plaintiff was part of a class of
secondary beneficiaries — including minor children, widows, widowers, and
parents — whose benefits would automatically terminate upon marriage to an
individual not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act. When he mar-
ried another disabled person, who was nonetheless not eligible for the benefits,
Mr. Jobst's benefits were terminated. Mr. Jobst claimed that the Act penalized
the exercise of his fundamental interest in marriage; and that its distinction
' 66 In several important instances, the government has spared an individual from
burdens caused solely by the individual's married status. Under the Selective Service Act of
1948, the President was authorized to defer any man with a wife, whether or not the man had
dependent children. Ch. 625, 5 6(h), 62 Stat. 612 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. APP. 5
456(h) (1976)).
Married persons also enjoy a tax benefit from the government. Of fundamental impor-
tance is the basic rate structure which allows a married individual to split his/her income with a
spouse. By filing a joint return, married individuals achieve substantial tax savings even though,
and especially when, only one spouse is responsible for the income and deductions. See I.R.C.
5 1(a), 6013(a) (1981).
In addition to •the general rate structure, there are many other tax advantages for the
married. For example, even though only one spouse has income, I.R.C. 6013(a), when filing
jointly, married individuals often are entitled to twice the dollar amount of credits against tax or
exclusions from income as a single individual is. E.g., I.R.C. 55 41(b)(1) (1981) (political con-
tribution tax credit).
' 67 A related, if readably distinguishable, problem relates to classifications that withhold
government benefits from a person who has chosen to divorce. See Mathews v. DeCastro, 429
U.S. 181 (1976). (holding that due process is not violated by S 202(b)(1) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 402(b)(1) (1973), which precludes divorced wives under 62 whose ex-husband
retires or becomes disabled from receiving monthly benefits under the Act).
"8 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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between those beneficiaries who married other eligible beneficiaries and those
who did not, without regard to actual dependency, was irrational. 169
 In an opin-
ion by Justice Stevens, a unanimous Court found that the challenged rule was
not "an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision
as important as marriage."'" In sustaining the termination of benefits for a
secondary beneficiary who married, the Court applied a traditional minimal
scrutiny rational basis standard."' It reasoned:
Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion that
marriage is an event which normally marks an important change in
economic status. Traditionally, the event not only creates a new
family with attendant new responsibilities, but also modifies the pre-
existing relationships between the bride and groom and their respec-
tive families. Frequently, of course, financial independence and
marriage do not go hand in hand. Nevertheless, there can be no
question about the validity of the assumption that a married person
is less likely to be dependent on his parents for support than one who
is unmarried.'"
Rather than being a penalty on the right to marriage, then, the Court found
the legislation to be a reasonable adaptation to likely changes in the recipient's
economic condition.
Turning to the plaintiff's second argument, the Court disagreed that the
classification was irrational. It found that administrative expediency was a suf-
ficient justification for distinguishing between marriages to eligible and ineligi-
ble persons rather than dependent and independent persons. In so doing, the
Court implicitly rejected intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review
for such cases, for it had previously refused to find administrative expediency a
sufficient governmental purpose where low-intermediate review standards
were applicable.'"
Prior to Zablocki v. Redhail, it would have been difficult to disagree with the
reading of Jobst which Justice Stevens, its author, provided in his concurring
opinion in Zablocki. Justice Stevens noted that "[a] classification based on
marital status is fundamentally different from a classification which determines
who may lawfully enter into the marriage relationship. The individual's in-
terest in making the marriage decision independently is sufficiently important
i" Because the defendant was the national government, the equal protection principles
asserted derived from due process rather than equal protection, See id. at 58.
'" Id. at 54 (footnote omitted).
' 71
 See id. at 52-54, 55-57. Pertinently, among the cases cited was Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975), which held that a classification under the Social Security Act distinguishing
widows who had married more than nine months before their husbands' deaths from those who
had married less than nine months before was to be reviewed under a traditional rational basis
standard. Id. at 768.
72 434 U.S. at 53.
'" E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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to merit special constitutional protection."'" Justice Stevens' opinion, then,
intimated that because Mr. Jobst was not subject to an absolute prohibition on
the right to marry, but only penalized for the exercise of that right, a standard
of review greater than minimum rationality was not warranted. A footnote in
Zablocki, however, distinguished Jobs! on different grounds, thus reopening the
question of whether the difference between the penalization and the prohibition
of the exercise of marital choice is a difference in degree or a dispositive dif-
ference in kind for the purpose of determining a constitutional standard of
review under the equal protection clause. The relevant footnote, in part, reads:
The directness and substantiality of the interference with the
freedom to marry distinguish the instant case from Califon° v. fobs!.
. . The Social Security provisions placed no direct legal obstacle
in the path of persons desiring to get married, and . . . there was no
evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone made
"practically impossible," any marriages. Indeed, the provisions had
not deterred the individual who challenged the statute from getting
married, even though he and his wife were both disabled. 15
It would seem that the Zablocki Court shifted judicial inquiry back to an ex-
amination of the interference in fact that a particular regulation has on marital
choice.
The Zablocki Court has thus spawned new questions regarding the stand-
ard of review to be applied to classifications which penalize exercise of the
choice to marry. For example, would plaintiff Jobst have been successful had
he brought suit before getting married and claimed he did not feel he could
marry without the continuation of social security benefits? Would he have
fared differently had he secured affidavits or testimony from a number of
secondary beneficiaries claiming they would have married but for the contested
rule, or perhaps introduced social science data to that effect? While Justice
Stevens' reading of fobst would introduce far more certainty into this area, the
Zablocki Court chose instead to leave open the possibility that a penalty (e.g.,
withdrawal of benefits) for choosing marriage may be prohibitory for constitu-
tional purposes if it is prohibitory in fact. But even assuming a challenger were
able to assert meaningfully the impingement on a fundamental interest in
marital choice, it is submitted that Jobs! was correctly decided. This is not
because penalties on the exercise of the choice to marry should be reviewed
under a minimum rationality standard, but rather because, even at a higher
level of review, the government could satisfy a "fair and substantial relation"
test with regard to Jobst's claim that his right to marital choice was penalized.
Until further clarification by the Supreme Court, however, it appears that the
standard of review to be applied to such classifications will remain subject to
the level of interference with the right to marital choice which the Court finds
present.
14 434 U.S. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
"5 Id. at 387 n.12 (citations omitted).
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E. Marital Privacy
Before attempting to understand the unique character of constitutional
marital privacy, it is useful to focus on the dual nature of the broader constitu-
tional concept of personal privacy. Writing for the Court in Whalen v. Roe in
1977, Justice Stevens noted: "[T]he cases sometimes characterized as protect-
ing 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One
is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions."'m At one level, then, there exist privacy rights grounded in an in-
terest in nondisclosure of personal matters. At another level, there is a private
right to autonomy inherent in certain important personal decisions faced by in-
dividuals. To the extent that cases protecting marital choice may be charac-
terized as privacy cases, they fall into Justice Stevens' second category of rights
to personal autonomy. Other decision-making, unique to family relationships,
such as whether to terminate a pregnancy'" or whether to enroll one's child in
a private school18
 have also come to be characterized by the court as a function
of constitutionally protected personal privacy.
To suggest, as the Court did in Loving, that the individual has a presump-
tive right to broad discretion in the choice of a marriage partner, does not speak
to unique rights which may devolve upon the association of two persons within
the institution of marriage. Unlike marital choice, the conceptual bases for the
assertion of privacy rights unique to the individual because he is 'married, find
their roots in justice Stevens' first category, freedom from disclosure, as well as
in the right to personal autonomy.
1. The Griswold Case
Certainly the leading, if not the only, Supreme Court case explicitly iden-
tifying a constitutional right to marital privacy is Griswold v. Connecticut. 19
There the Court struck down state criminal statutes which indiscriminately
prohibited the use of contraceptives by the married and the unmarried. The
appellants had informed, instructed and medically advised married persons
about contraception, and for this had been convicted as accessories in abetting
the prohibited use of contraceptives. By appropriately asserting third person
interests, the appellants launched a constitutional attack on the Connecticut
statutes for violating the unique rights of married persons.
The Griswold Court found it unnecessary to address the constitutional
acceptability of banning contraceptive use by the unmarried. The four opin-
ions offered by the seven justice majority all emphasized marital privacy as the
value at stake in the litigation. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, ap-
parently felt constrained to tie the marital privacy right to the text of the Bill of
1 " 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
'" See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
179 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Rights, implicitly restricting judicial identification of fundamental rights to the
theories of fourteenth amendment incorporation. Justice Douglas suggested
that various provisions of the Bill of Rights have penumbras, "formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.' ,180
With the exceptions of references to the first and ninth amendments,'" the
constitutional provisions cited by the Court are basically within the concept of
procedural due process incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. These
provisions usually limit the authority of the state to adopt certain methods of
enforcing its laws. The privacy concepts emerging from the third, fourth, and
fifth amendments, reflected in the cases relied upon by the Court,'" as well as
in the language of the amendments themselves, are rooted in Justice Stevens'
first category of privacy — freedom from disclosure. Even with regard to the
penumbra of the first amendment, the principal case relied upon by the Court,
NAACP v. Alabama,' 83 suggested a notion of privacy which related to immunity
of conduct from public disclosure rather than to liberty to make particular im-
portant decisions.'"
Having identified a privacy right which was fundamentally procedural in
nature, the Griswold Court had to address the scope of that right. For example,
was all conduct in the home to be protected from disclosure? Was all sexual
conduct presumptively protected? The Court used the substantive interest in
familial choice' 85 to define and limit, at least temporarily, the procedurally based
right to privacy it had identified. Marriage was "a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees," the
Court noted.' 8€ A law forbidding the use of contraceptives could not be con-
stitutionally applied to married couples:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights —
older than our political parties, older than our school system. Mar-
riage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.'"
18° Id. at 484,
18 ' Justice Douglas' opinion made no other reference to the ninth amendment, although
its importance to the Court's result was stressed in a concurring opinion by Justice Goldberg. Id.
at 486-99.
1"2 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656 (1961).
183 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
'" In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court found that the state's order requiring disclosure of
the names and addresses of all NAACP members violated the first amendment because of its
"substantial restraint" on associational rights. Id. at 308-10.
1 " 381 U.S. at 482 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
186 381 U.S. at 485.
187 Id. at 486.
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Such an association, ruled the Court, could not be subjected to the enforce-
ment of Connecticut's proscription of contraception.
As a result of Griswold, married people have the right to choose to use con-
traceptives. Whether that is because birth control decisions are very important
to marriage, or because we would not "allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of cant racept ives,"' 88
— or both — is unclear. In any event, invoking the standard which had pro-
hibited associational disclosures in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court invalidated
the Connecticut prohibitions because "a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro-
tected freedoms."' 89
The concurring opinions, while disagreeing to some extent on the standards
which need be employed to identify fundamental rights not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution, shed little light on the conceptual underpinnings of what all
agreed was the issue at stake in the case — marital privacy. But four of the con-
curring Justices in the seven member majority, either by extensive quotation
or incorporation by reference,' 9 ' adopted the views expressed in justice Harlan's
dissent in the 1961 case of Poe u. Ullman.' 92 In Poe, which also involved a
challenge to prohibitions on the use of contraceptives, Justice Harlan said:
Although the form of intrusion here — the enactment of a
substantive offense — does not, in my opinion, preclude the making
of a claim based on the right to privacy embraced in the 'liberty' of
the Due Process Clause, it must be acknowledged that there is
another sense in which it could be argued that this intrusion on
privacy differs from what the Fourth Amendment, and the similar
concept of the Fourteenth, were intended to protect: here we have
not an intrusion into the home so much as on the life which charac-
teristically has its place in the home. But in my mind such a distinc-
tion is so insubstantial as to be captious: if the physical curtilage of
the home is protected, it is surely as a result of solicitude to protect
the privacies of the life within. . . . The home derives its pre-
eminence as the seat of family life . . .
Of this whole "private realm of family life" it is difficult to im-
agine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations.'"
The adoption of justice Harlan's views in the concurring opinions of Griswold
thus lends substance to the notion that marital privacy is a hybrid of rights to
personal autonomy and rights to freedom from disclosure.
' 88 Id, at 485.
189
 Id. (citation omitted).
' 9° Id. at 495, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
' 9 ' Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
'" 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
193 Id. at 551-52.
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Aside from the uncertainties surrounding the roots of the right to marital
privacy, questions remain regarding the application of the right. Even assum-
ing that the zone of privacy extends only to married couples, Griswold's reach is
still unclear. Presumably, married people may be convicted of murder, even if
the act is committed in the marital bedroom. Nevertheless, it is arguable, in
light of Griswold, that the state has to satisfy a greater burden whenever it
restricts the activities of married persons consorting within the physical con-
fines of their home or bedroom. Although the Court did not explicitly deal with
the question, it is more likely that Griswold's privacy rights are limited to con-
sensual sexual conduct.'" It could be argued that the right should be narrowed
even further to protect only potentially procreative sexual conduct because of
the greater centrality of such conduct to the historic "purposes" of marriage.
There is little in the opinion itself, however, to suggest that the personal in-
terest in preventing conception is what generated the presumption that the
Connecticut statute was invalid.
Courts have been unable to agree whether a state may prohibit consensual
sodomy' 95 or other forms of nonprocreative sexual activity between married
people. If constitutional privacy does extend to sexual activity, it is not clear
whether that concept is defined by genital involvement or by some broader
psychological notions of sexuality. For example, some sexual activity may in-
volve weapons which, even if consensually used, might generate charges of ag-
gravated criminal assault if employed outside the intimacies of marriage. One
federal court of appeals has held, over a strenuous dissent, that while consen-
sual sodomy between married persons falls within the zone of constitutional
privacy, the right may be waived if the individuals accept the presence of
onlookers.'" If this is a correct statement of the law, it reinforces a reading of
Griswold which suggests that the right to marital privacy is derived from the in-
terest in not having intimacy disclosed rather than the interest in making im-
portant decisions.
While the origins and future applications of Griswold remain unclear, it
nevertheless appears that the case was properly decided. It is not the existence
of any unique interest in sexual privacy held by the married which compelled
194 As marital privacy attaches to the relationship of two people, protected conduct
presumably requires the consent of each. Cf. Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, Circuit Justice) (assuming that state decision which held that the state may regulate con-
duct by consenting married adults was incorrect).
199 E.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968)
(state may not prohibit consensual sodomy absent a showing of force); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F.
Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969) (Virginia sodomy statute not unconstitutionally applied as petitioner
had been tried and convicted of forcing act upon wife); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass.
298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974) (Massachusetts sodomy statute could not be construed to include
private, consensual conduct of adults, but it did prohibit forced conduct). Contra, State v. Elliot,
89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976) (upheld constitutionality of New Mexico sodomy statute
under which lack of consent was not an element of offense); Washington v. Rodriguez, 82 N.M.
428, 483 P.2d 309 (1971) (same result).
96 Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
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the result. Rather, it is the principle that any exercise of sexual choice which
does not intrude upon the interest of others, should be presumptively beyond
the reach of the state. None of the social policy arguments which Connecticut
employed could satisfy strict scrutiny review. In addition, the argument that
contraception is morally wrong is simply not widely enough shared in com-
parable legal systems to qualify under strict scrutiny as a compelling state in-
terest.
Finally, one question left open on the facts of the Griswold opinion was
whether a state could impinge indirectly on contraception decisions by cutting
off the sources of contraceptives, i.e., prohibiting their manufacture or sale.
Justice Douglas, after rejecting the minimal rationality standard for reviewing
economic and social legislation,' 92 emphasized that the challenged statute for-
bade "the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or
sale. "198 It may be hypothesized that limiting the availability of some contra-
ceptive methods might be sustainable if adequately supported by public health
evidence. Notwithstanding the conscious effort of the Griswold Court to limit its
holding, however, it appears that any state policy which prevents or
significantly inhibits married persons from choosing to employ contraception,
would violate the due process clause.' 99
2. Subsequent Developments in the Supreme Court
While Griswold remains the seminal marital privacy case, other Supreme
Court decisions have played a significant role in the development of the doc-
trine. The 1972 case of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 20° for example, invalidated a Massa-
chusetts statute denying access to contraceptives to unmarried persons. The deci-
sion is important to a consideration of marital privacy insofar as the Eisenstadt
Court's interpretations of Griswold may cloud its meaning. In Eisenstadt, the
Supreme Court chose to consider the challenged statute under the equal pro-
tection clause, without addressing the appellee's substantive due process
claims. It recognized that the classification between married and unmarried
persons did not in itself call into play a standard of review more stringent than
the rational basis test. 20 ' The Court fairly searchingly explored proffered state
justifications for the statute, and explicitly rejected as insufficient those to
which the means had only a "marginal relation." 2 ° 2 In reality, then, the Court
seemed to call into play, at the very least, the "strict rationality" level of
scrutiny. Having rejected state justifications for deterring fornication and pro-
tecting health, the Court posed the question of whether the state's prohibition
' 97 381 U.S. at 482.
198 Id. at 485.
19 Indeed, in Carey v. Population Services Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court struck
down as violative of due process, restrictions on the sale or distribution of contraceptives to un-
married minors.
2°° 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
2°1 Id. at 447.
2 ° 2 Id. at 448.
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might be sustained "simply as a prohibition on contraception." Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the Court, continued:
We need not and do not, however, decide that important ques-
tion in this case because, whatever the rights of the individual to ac-
cess to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the
unmarried and married alike.
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried
persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold
the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child . . .
On the other hand, if Griswold is no bar to a prohibition on the
distribution of contraceptives, the State could not, consistently with
the Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to unmarried but
not to married persons. In each case the evil, as perceived by the
State, would be identical, and the underinclusion would be invidi-
ous . . . "3
By Justice Brennan's virtually total equation between the rights of the married
and unmarried stemming from Griswold, it would appear that what was initial-
ly a rather narrowly delineated assertion of marital sexual privacy has become,
albeit within the rubric of equal protection analysis, a constitutionally sig-
nificant interest in procreative privacy. The interest has been rather substan-
tially transformed, or at least expanded, from one principally grounded in non-
disclosure to one rooted in the protection of important personal choice.
Griswold and Eisenstadt can of course be reconciled if one does not ascribe
too much importance to the rhetoric of Justice Brennan's equation. Marriage
may only be important in Griswold as one of a number of possible manifesta-
tions of family privacy. 204 Similarly, Eisenstadt can be viewed as a decision based
on notions of family privacy. The interest in Eisenstadt, however, is an interest
in whether to form or expand a family unit, irrespective of marriage. Alter-
natively, it may be argued that Eisenstadt, in identifying a constitutionally
significant interest rather than a fundamental right, 205 has extended some con-
stitutional protection to procreation outside the marriage context, but at a
lower level of review.
"s Id. at 453-54 (citations and footnote omitted).
204 Contraception inevitably involves at least an interest in whether to form or expand a
family unit, irrespective of marriage.
2 °5 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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While Griswold and Eisenstadt found that unilateral actions taken by the
state violated the right to marital privacy, Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Dan-
forth2" ruled that the joint actions of the state and a marital partner might also
violate such principles. Planned Parenthood considered at length the constitution-
ality of Missouri's comprehensive legislation regulating abortions: 207 Missouri
had required prior written consent of the husband of any married woman seek-
ing an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy unless "the abortion
is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of
the mother."'" The state sought to justify this additional qualification on the
individual right to abort based upon its "perception of marriage as an institu-
tion" whose value would be preserved by assuring "that any major change in
family status is a decision made jointly by the marriage partners." 2"
The Court acknowledged the husband's significant interest in the fetus,
and the state's important interest in preserving harmonious marriages. None-
theless, it declared the requirements unconstitutional. Expressing doubt that
such legislation would foster mutuality and trust in marriages, the Court held
that, in any event, "the state has [no] constitutional authority to give the
spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her
pregnancy when the state itself lacks that right." 21 °
It can be argued that Planned Parenthood reduces the value of marital rights
asserted in Griswold by exalting the individual above the associational entity.
Such an argument, however, misstates the decision's true meaning. Although
the underlying right that the Court identifies is the personal right of the wife,
her right to make the abortion decision is sustained not at the expense of
marital privacy, but in furtherance of it. Planned Parenthood announces to states
that they may not interfere with a conflict that involves procreative decisions
within a marriage, at least not without a more compelling justification than
dubious speculation that the interference will ultimately promote stability in
the marriage.
The nature and scope of the right to marital privacy announced in
Griswold continues to be subject to further development. Out of a right to
marital privacy has grown a further insulation of the family unit from state in-
terference of the type defined in Planned Parenthood. In addition, the right to
marital privacy has spawned an important individual interest in procreation in
general, as illustrated in Eisenstadt v. Baird.
206 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
207 Planned Parenthood arose against the backdrop of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
which established a woman's constitutional right to an abortion during the first two trimesters of
pregnancy, qualified only by the state's interest in regulating medical procedures during the sec-
ond trimester.
208 428 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1976).
209 Id. at 68.
210 Id. at 70, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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III. DIVORCE
"Divorce" has been simply defined by Professor Clark as "the legal ter-
mination of a valid marriage."'" Marriage, whether viewed as a contract, a
legal status, or a combination of both, creates, at least in all American jurisdic-
tions, 212 a restriction on an otherwise constitutionally protected personal liberty
— the right of the individual to marry. Because the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting polygamy has been unequivocally sustained by the United States
Supreme Court,'" governmental determinations of the conditions under which
divorce is available implicate interests closely related to the liberty to choose
whether and whom to marry.
A. Divorce as a Fundamental Right
Historically, divorce has been a legal event requiring a judicial proceed-
ing, 214 as contrasted with marriage, a legal event of arguably similar dimen-
sion, which has not required the trappings of the judicial process. The state's
imprimatur upon a marriage demands the satisfaction of certain findings of
fact just as its determination to grant divorce does. Because the findings re-
quired for marriage are normally easily verifiable and uncontested, and do not
involve agonizing questions of fault, the simplest administrative procedures for
their determination have been universally viewed as sufficient. 215 In contrast,
the substantive laws controlling divorce — both those establishing standards
for whether it shall be granted and those determining what any equitable
divorce decree will require of the parties — have demanded fact finding on
difficult questions such as personal fault, intent of the parties as to property ac-
quired during a marriage, and the best interests of the children of the marriage.
Perhaps reflecting an adoption by the legal system of religious views regarding
the sanctity of marriage and the concomitant suspect character of divorce, the
exercise of divorce has been uniformly subjected to solemnization by courts in
the United States, and administered under the mechanisms of adversarial
justice.
An examination of the concept of divorce as a fundamental right differs
from a similar analysis of marriage in that the Supreme Court has yet to con-
sider the constitutional limits on the substantive criteria a state may employ for
the granting of a divorce. 216 The cases considering procedural access to
2 " Clark, supra note 121, at 280.
212 Id. at 61.
212 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
2 " It is true that in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209 (1888), the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of a divorce granted by the legislature of the territory of Washington, but
the decision seemed to imply that the absence of jurisdiction vested in any judicial tribunal re-




generally Clark, supra note 121, at 36-38. Cf. note 156 supra (where question of
mental fitness is involved, a hearing would be required).
216 See generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1308-13.
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divorce, however, can serve as a basis for a discussion of divorce as a fun-
damental right.
1. Procedural Access
The leading Supreme Court case in the divorce area arising under the due
process clause is Boddie v. Connecticut,'" decided in 1971. The substantive
characteristics of Connecticut's divorce laws were not questioned in that class
action. The plaintiffs were indigent persons desirous of instituting suits for
divorce. Unfortunately, they could not afford the $45 court costs and the fees
for service of process by local sheriffs (averaging $15) which were authorized by
state law. The plaintiffs claimed that the assessment of these costs denied them
access to divorce in violation of their rights under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, chose not to address the
equal protection claim, but did strike down the Connecticut requirements as
violative of due process.'" The Court stated:
Our conclusion is that given the basic position of the marriage rela-
tionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relation-
ship, due process does prohibit a State from denying solely because
of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek
judicial dissolution of their marriages.'"
Thus, there seemed to be two central bases for the result: the fundamentality of
marriage (and presumably the choice to dissolve it), and the unique procedural
situation of divorce as the only private dispute not legally resolvable without
the active intervention of state judicial machinery.
A close reading of Justice Harlan's opinion would seem to suggest that the
unique role of the judiciary in the effectuation of divorce was as important to
the outcome of the case as were any qualitative judgments about the weight to
be given the personal interest involved. While the Court recognized that "mar-
riage involves interests of basic importance in our society, " 22° it relied on this
perception only to explain state monopolization of the divorce process. Com-
mercial litigation was distinguished not because it involved interests of lesser
constitutional magnitude, but because no judicial imprimatur was required for
dispute resolution. 221
 The Court thus equated the procedural interests of these
plaintiffs with the procedural due process needs of defendants, parties normally
subjected to judicial machinery through no voluntary choice on their own part.
The Court said: "Just as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy
2 " 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
219 Id. at 374.
2" Id.
220 Id. at 376.
221
 Id.
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due process because of the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost re-
quirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to
foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard." 222 As Connecticut's re-
quirements were tantamount to denial of a hearing, they could be sustained on-
ly if justified by overriding state interests which could not be achieved by
means less intrusive of presumptive constitutional rights. The justifications ad-
vanced by the state — the prevention of frivolous litigation and conservation of
scarce state resources — were both judged insufficient to meet this standard."'
To begin, the filing fee requirement was overbroad, sweeping within its denial
of access admittedly good faith plaintiffs such as those who had brought the ac-
tion before the Court. In addition, alternative means for ferreting out frivolous
litigants and for reducing the cost of process service were available to the
state. 224 The Court was equally unimpressed by the state's allocation of
resources justification with respect to court costs and relied on one of a line of
cases rejecting the argument that such a state interest is compelling. 225
That the Boddie Court had not established a broad due process right to
judicial access for the aggrieved poor in areas not touching marriage became
clear in two subsequent cases, United States v. Kras226 and Ortein v. Schwab, 227
both decided in 1973. In Kras, the Court rejected the extension of Boddie to the
invalidation of filing fees barring access for indigents to the federal judicial
bankruptcy process. The Ortein Court sustained the imposition of court fees on
those seeking to challenge adverse administrative welfare determinations, even
though the fees in fact precluded judicial access for the indigent. In Kras, the
Court distinguished Boddie in part by finding means other than bankruptcy
available, at least in theory, for the resolution of disputes within the purview of
bankruptcy proceedings.'" The Ortein Court relied on the due process safe-
guards available to welfare claimants at the administrative level in
distinguishing Boddie. 229 But both cases focused on the fundamentality of the
substantive interests asserted in Boddie as well. Justice Blackmun, speaking for
the Court in Kras, appeared to go further than the Boddie opinion itself had in
valuing the importance of the personal interest in divorce:
The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie touched directly
on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that
surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship. On
many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of
222 Id. at 380.
222 Id. at 381.
224
 Id. at 381-82.
223 Id. at 382. The Court relied on its prior holding in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), in which substantially the same argument was advanced by the state and rejected by the
Court.
226 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
225 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
229 409 U.S. at 445.
229 410 U.S. at 659-60.
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those interests under our Constitution (citations omitted). The Bod-
die appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously im-
paired their freedom to pursue other protected associational ac-
tivities. Kras' alleged interest . . . although important . . does
not rise to the same constitutional level.'"
The Court's characterization of the liberties protected as "associational"
suggests a focus on the interest in remarrying as the primary source of the
substantive component of the fundamental right identified by Boddie.
Presumably, therefore, a state might separate the issue of whether a divorce
should be granted, for which it may not impose court costs against a plaintiff,
from issues such as alimony, child support and custody, which, "although im-
portant," probably do "not rise to the same constitutional level." 23 '
If one cannot be denied access to divorce on account of indigency, ques-
tions remain about what procedural rights must attend such access. The most
frequently asserted procedural right has been the right to counsel, claimed by
both indigent plaintiffs and defendants. The Supreme Court has not chosen to
consider the question, but the response of both state courts"' and lower federal
courts"' has been unequivocal: there is no right to state provided counsel for
indigent divorce litigants. 234 The judicial response in right to counsel cases may
pose a dilemma, however, in view of state laws, which have been sustained
against constitutional attack, 235
 prohibiting non-lawyers from engaging in
divorce counseling. 236
 Yet, in theory, so long as a divorce plaintiff is permitted
to conduct a suit without counsel, it would appear that the minimal re-
quirements of Boddie have been met.
The sounder conclusion would seem to be that, contrary to the case law,
when due process demands access to the courts because of the fundamentality
of the personal interests at stake and the state's monopolization of dispute reso-
lution, such access must assure a minimum level of effectiveness for both plain-
tiffs and defendants. If a state decides to preserve the adversarial character of
divorce proceedings (a decision not clearly constitutionally mandated 237) a
230 409 U.S. at 444-45.
231 Id. at 445. As with conflicts between debtors and creditors, conflicts concerning the
conditions of divorce decrees, such as child custody arrangements, can be resolved without direct
judicial sanction.
232 See note 234 infra.
233
234 Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P,2d 139 (Okla. 1977); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330
N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975); Wilson v. Wilson, 218 Pa. Super. 344, 280 A.2d 665
(1971); Parsley v. Knuckles, 346 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1961).
235
	 State Bar v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976),
236
 See, e.g., In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1978) (en bane); Florida Bar v.
Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or. 552, 538 P.2d
913 (1975) (en bane); State v. Winder, 42 A.D.2d 1039, 348 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1973). See generally
Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104
(1976).
" 7 Statutes providing for non-adversarial divorce procedures have been upheld against
a variety of constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Donkin v. Donkin, 35 Conn. Supp. 123, 399 A.2d
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minimum level of effectiveness should require the state to provide counsel for
indigent plaintiffs and defendants. Were a state to abandon the adversarial
system of divorce, and adopt any one of a number of non-adversarial models
which have been proposed, 238 the argument for counsel as a necessary compo-
nent of procedural due process would obviously diminish.
State policies which have the impact of delaying, rather than denying, ac-
cess to a state's divorce process, would appear to be constitutionally accept-
able, so long as they are reasonably related to legitimate state interests. This
was one of the lessons of Sosna v. lowa, 299 a case which sustained a state's one-
year durational residency requirement for divorce. Noting that the require-
ment merely delayed the exercise of an otherwise existing right to access, the
Court identified, albeit in the context of an equal protection challenge, a
legitimate state interest in insuring that a divorce plaintiff is sufficiently attached
to the state before issues of such moment as child custody and support must be
resolved. 240
 Under similar analysis, it is clear that no state can be prevented
from manda.ting "a cooling off period, 24 ' or insisting upon compulsory mar-
riage counseling, 242 prior to making its judicial apparatus available to divorce
aspirants. The legitimate interests of the state in attempting to stabilize and
preserve families in crisis are manifest. Of course, the period of delay occasioned
by these interests must be reasonable.
2. As a Function of Substantive Due Process
By demanding state demonstration of an "interest of overriding
significance," 243 and by noting the existence of less restrictive means for the
844 (Super. Ct. 1978); In re Marriage of Franks, 189 Colo. 499, 542 P.2d 845 (1975) (en banc),
application for stay denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976); Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d
846 (1975); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973); Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134
(Ky. 1973); In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
239 discussions of proposals reflecting a trend to adopt non-adversarial models, see
Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979); Feldman, A Statutory Proposal to Remove Divorce from the Courtroom, 29 ME. L. REV. 25
(1977); Walker, Bryond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to Present Divorce
Laws, 10 J. FAM. L. 267 (1971); Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model
Statute & Commentary, 3 FAM. L. Q. 75 (1969).
2" 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
240 The Court noted that the state's residency requirement could "reasonably be
justified on grounds other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative convenience."
Id, at 406. Suggested justifications included: (a) the state's concern for the consequences of
divorce proceedings, (b) the state's interest in avoiding "officious intermeddling" in another
state's matters and in protecting its own decrees from collateral attack, (c) the state's "quite
reasonable" decision not to become a "divorce mill," and (d) the state's interest in insuring that
other states would grant its decrees full faith and credit. Id. at 407.
2" See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-1608(a) (Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. 5 403.044
(Supp. 1980) (minor children involved); S.C. CODE 5 20-3-80 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. 5 25-4-34 (1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 5 3.60 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE
ANN. 5 30-3-18 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 767.083(2) (West Special Pamphlet 1980).
242 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 60-1608(c) (Supp. 1980) (at judge's discretion when
minor children involved); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 5 691 (1981) (at judge's discretion);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 458:7-b (Supp. 1979) (same); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 5 3.54
(Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. 55 767.081(1), .083(1) (West Special Pam-
phlet 1980). See also S.C. CODE 5 20-3-90 (1977) (judge must try to reconcile parties).
243 401 U.S. at 377.
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state to achieve its interest, the Boddie Court could be said to have identified
divorce as a fundamental right. 244 The importance of the element of state
monopolization over the processes of divorce to the Boddie decision, however,
cautions against a hasty conclusion that all substantive barriers to divorce
should be tested by strict scrutiny. Indeed, under the reasoning of Kras, the
constitutional right to divorce would seem to derive from the interest in marital
choice. Impairments of that interest, as noted above, may be tested under a
standard somewhat less rigorous than strict scrutiny.
A state's categorical refusal to grant divorces would, of course, be tanta-
mount to a denial of both procedural access and a substantive legal right. In
this respect, Boddie would seem to be controlling. That is, there is an interest in
choosing to marry which cannot be lawfully exercised by a person already
holding a married status. But that status has been conferred by the state, which
has the exclusive prerogative to remove it. Its categorical refusal to do so is a
restriction on liberty of a magnitude which demands strict scrutiny. In some in-
stances there are important constitutional distinctions between state action and
state inaction. For example, a state which may not constitutionally prohibit
abortion, also need not provide it. 245
 But in the cases of marriage and divorce,
where the interest involved is fundamental and only the state is in a position to
vindicate that interest, the state may refuse to act only if it satisfies the tests of
compelling interest and least restrictive means.
While a categorical denial of access to divorce seems properly subjected to
strict scrutiny, questions remain concerning the standard of review to be ap-
plied to more narrow restrictions on divorce. For example, may a state limit
divorce to situations where both spouses are desirous of dissolving their mar-
riage? The state may argue that when it is confronted with a dispute where one
party's interest in marital choice will inevitably be defeated, it may reasonably
choose between personal interests of similar dimension by favoring the contin-
uation, rather than dissolution, of existing families. This would be an appeal-
ing argument were the interests of the moving and contesting parties constitu-
tionally comparable. They are not. There is no protectible liberty interest in
being married to the person of one's choice. There is, however, a liberty in-
terest in freedom from state interference with a mutual marital choice. Thus, it
is the party seeking divorce whose interest in marital choice is primary; the
state may not categorically defeat his interest by interposing the wishes of a
non-consenting spouse.
As there is no foreseeable prospect of any American state attempting to
abolish the legal action for divorce between consenting or non-consenting
spouses, the foregoing discussion bears more importantly on whether married
persons unable to meet a state's divorce requirements may seek support from
the due process clause in arguing that the substantive requirements of state
divorce laws are too restrictive to meet constitutional standards. May it be
reasonably advanced, for example, that a state which limits substantive
244 See generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1310-11.
245 See Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S.Ct. 2694 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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grounds for divorce to adultery and physical cruelty, or other fault criteria,
transgresses personal liberty rights protected by due process?
Kras recognized that the "fundamental interest" at stake in divorce was
presumptively entitled to freedom from "serious impairment."'" Where a
state has not totally precluded access to divorce, but has limited it to those who
can satisfy particular substantive criteria, it is submitted that those re-
quirements should be tested by a review standard at high-intermediate
scrutiny. In other words, such requirements must bear a substantial relation-
ship to important state objectives and be closely tailored to meeting only those
objectives. This standard was developed under an equal protection analysis in
the 1978 Supreme Court decision of Zablocki v. Redhail. 2" Judging from the
Court's employment of a means analysis to strike down the Connecticut access
requirements at issue in Boddie, the inclusion of a means component would
seem to follow in the due process context as well.
Where childless spouses both seek a divorce, the conclusion seems
unassailable that no justification for fault-based requirements can satisfy any
standard more rigorous than minimum rationality. Even where children are af-
fected, it seems difficult to hypothesize a concededly important interest in their
welfare which could not be achieved by means more closely tailored to that in-
terest such as case-by-case determinations of how their welfare might be best
served.
Where only one spouse is desirous of divorce, state requirements for the
demonstration of fault are not on any firmer constitutional ground. There
seems to be no substantial reason for denying divorce to a plaintiff who married
a faithful and kind spouse, unless a continuing restriction of the plaintiff's
liberty is to be the defendant's reward for virtue. Such a justification could not
pass the most minimal scrutiny. It is quite another matter, however, to deny
divorce to a plaintiff who has behaved in a morally blameworthy manner. In
such instances, the spouse's conduct may operate as a voluntary relinquish-
ment of the presumptive right to marital choice resuscitated by the granting of
divorce . 2"
The unacceptability of requiring findings of fault precedent to the grant-
ing of divorce are conclusions increasingly reached as a matter of policy by
state legislatures.'" The constitutional necessity of this trend has not yet been
2f6 409 U.S. at 444-45.
27
 434 U.S. 374 (1978). See discussion in text at notes 32-37 & 125-35 supra.
'ft' Such a theory would be consistent with the common law defense of recrimination,
which operated to prevent parties who had themselves been guilty of a marital offense from secur-
ing a divorce on the basis of their spouse's misconduct. Simply put, if both parties had been guil-
ty of conduct constituting a ground for divorce, neither party could obtain a decree. The doctrine
has been criticized in recent years and many jurisdictions have re-evaluated its use in their
courts. See generally Moore, An Examination of the Recrimination Doctrine, 20 S.C. L. REV. 685 (1968);
Note, Domestic Relations — Divorce — Restrictions on Recrimination, 46 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1979).
' 49
 An indication of this trend is that only two states still retain solely fault-based
grounds for divorce. Many of the other forty-eight states have added "irretrievable breakdown"
to their divorce systems and at least fifteen states use only "irretrievable breakdown." For a
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identified by the Supreme Court, Such a result seems to flow logically from
cases such as Boddie and Zablocki which reinforce the great constitutional weight
accorded to the liberty interest in marital choice. While it appears that these
conclusions are substantively sound, they must be qualified by the oft-
expressed recognition of the Supreme Court, within the context of the federal
system of power allocation, that the "regulation of domestic relations . has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States." 25° Indeed,
as the Court stated in 1877: "The State . . has absolute right to prescribe
the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved. . )'25I
That statement is assuredly no longer accurate with regard to marriage, as
the discussion in the previous section has repeatedly demonstrated. Yet it is not
demonstrably false as to divorce, as the Supreme Court has yet to declare any
substantive state requirements for the granting of divorce unconstitutional.
To summarize, the concept of divorce as a fundamental right has not yet
been fully addressed by the Supreme Court. The interplay of the interest in
marital choice with the state's monopolization of the processes of divorce led
the Boddie Court to strike down filing fees which restricted access to divorce. To
the extent that Boddie rested on notions of a fundamental right to divorce,
however, the decision has not been read as demanding that procedural safe-
guards, such as the right to counsel, accompany access to divorce. In addition,
legitimate state policies which delay, rather than deny, access to divorce may
also pass constitutional muster. Finally, while the Supreme Court has yet to
declare any substantive state requirements for divorce unconstitutional, such
restrictions must arguably be subjected to a high-intermediate standard of
substantive due process scrutiny.
B. Access to Divorce and Concepts of Equality
The kinds of classifications which government has established to control
access to marriage by and large have not been invoked to deny access to
divorce. Thus, where a particular jurisdiction might have discouraged inter-
racial marriages or marriages between minors, it would be unlikely to
discourage dissolution of such marriages formed and recognized elsewhere.
And the very existence of some universally prohibitory classifications on access
to marriage, e.g., between members of the same sex, removes some frequently
challenged classifying traits from the ambit of unequal access to divorce.
survey complete as of August 1, 1977, see Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty Slates: An Outline, 11
FAM. L.Q. 297 (1977). Since the publication of that survey, the two holdout states have not
changed their positions, See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 40, par. 401(2) (Smith-Hurd 1980); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 25-4-2 (1977).
"° Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975), citing Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167
(1899); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (dictum); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 582, 584 (1859).
251 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (dictum).
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There have been, however, two notable challenges raised in the Supreme
Court to state policies having the effect of creating unequal access to divorce.
The earlier of these cases, Boddie v. Connecticut,'" discussed at length in the
previous section, saw a majority of the Court treat the exclusion of the poor by
reason of their inability to pay court costs as a denial of due process. Although
the majority opinion did not address the equal protection issue, Justices
Douglas and Brennan, in their separate opinions, identified violations of the
equal protection clause in the Connecticut fee system.
While wealth-based classifications were identified by the Supreme Court
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections"' as "disfavored, " 254 the Court has since
that point continually rejected the position that de facto wealth classifications,
in the form of taxes or fees, activate on their own any standard of review more
rigorous than minimum rationality. 255 Therefore, notwithstanding Justice
Douglas' concurring reliance on the wealth basis of the classification worked by
Connecticut's imposition of court fees in Boddie,'" the principal arguments to
be mounted against such fees under the equal protection clause must rely on
the tenets of fundamental interest analysis.
Were the interest in access to divorce clearly fundamental, Harper, which
had struck down a state poll tax as a wealth classification impinging upon the
fundamental interest in voting, would clearly control the equal protection issue
raised by the plaintiffs in Boddie. Indeed, the Harper Court had not been content
with striking down the poll tax as it applied to those unable to pay it, but in-
validated it on its face.
The arguments supporting the existence of a fundamental interest in ac-
cess to divorce derive from (1) the fundamental right to divorce identified and
given due process protection in Boddie; and (2) the fundamental interest in
marital choice recognized in a number of equal protection cases. 257 The
obstacle to clearly rooting the fundamental interest in Boddie is that the Court
there, albeit ambiguously, sought to limit its holding to the identification of
procedural rights. Its emphasis on Connecticut's effective denial of a hearing
252
 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
2" 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"4 Id. at 668. See discussion in note 25 supra.
2" E.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
256 Justice Douglas noted:
An invidious discrimination based on poverty is adequate for this case. While
Connecticut has provided a procedure for severing the bonds of maPriage, a per-
son can meet every requirement save court fees or the cost of service of process and
be denied a divorce . . .
Thus, under Connecticut law divorces may be denied or granted solely on the
basis of wealth .	 .
401 U.S. at 386.
2" See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
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may have placed divorce aspirants in the same position as polluting manufac-
turers, who can claim the right to a hearing before they are required by the
state to close their factories, but cannot claim a fundamental interest in their
manufacturing activities as such for equal protection purposes."'
There are also potential objections to equating the fundamentality of the
interest in access to divorce with the fundamentality of the interest in marital
choice recognized in cases like Zablocki v. Redhail. 2" It may be argued that only
the unmarried have a fundamental interest in marital choice; thus, there is no
interest of constitutional dimension borne by a married person in which his
purported fundamental interest in divorce can be rooted. Put another way, the
fundamental interest in marital choice is not renewable at the whim of the in-
dividual.
But this argument may be refuted. In Zablocki, the Supreme Court placed
the roots of the fundamental interest in marital choice in the "right to
privacy, '260 presumably that component which protects important decisions
preservative of personal identity. 261
 The importance of the interest in one's
marital status as a function of personal identity is as great with regard to
divorce as it is with regard to marriage. If equal protection interest analysis is
to extend a high level of scrutiny to infringements of the interest in marital
choice it ought to extend a similar level of scrutiny to denials of access to
divorce.
Another Supreme Court case, however, decided in 1975 may cast doubt
on that conclusion. The plaintiff in Sosna v. Iowa, 262 filed a class action in
federal court challenging the constitutionality under the due process and equal
protection clauses of Iowa's one-year residency requirement for the
maintenance of a divorce action in that state's courts. In pursuing the equal
protection claim, the plaintiff argued that Iowa was penalizing two fundamen-
tal interests, interstate travel and access to divorce, thereby triggering strict
scrutiny of the classification. Support for this argument was found in Shapiro v.
Thompson 263 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 264 two cases where the
Court had imposed strict scrutiny on the penalization of interstate migration
through the imposition of durational residency requirements denying welfare
and public health benefits. Reliance was also placed on Dunn v. Blumstein, 265
238 See, e.g. , New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
259 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
260 Id. at 384.
261
 In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous
Court, stated that there are "at least two different kinds of [privacy] interests. One is the in-
dividual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in in-
dependence in making certain kinds of important decisions," Id. at 599-600. See also, e.g. , Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925).
262 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
263
 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
264 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
265 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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where the Court had applied strict scrutiny to a durational residency require-
ment for voter registration which had penalized the fundamental interests in
voting and interstate travel.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, rejecting Mrs. Sosna's equal protection
claims, was notable for its failure to adopt a clear standard of review. At one
point, the Court distinguished Shapiro, Maricopa County and Dunn on the basis
that the challenged requirements in those cases absolutely denied a governmen-
tal benefit while Iowa's rule merely delayed the interest in access to divorce. At
another point, the Court distinguished those same cases on the grounds that,
unlike Iowa, the states had failed to advance interests of sufficient magnitude to
justify the restrictions. The Court explained: "What those cases had in com-
mon was that the durational residency requirements they struck down were
justified on the basis of budgetary or recordkeeping considerations which were
held insufficient to outweigh the constitutional claims of the individuals. "266
Iowa's justifications for its rule, however, appeared to strike Justice Rehnquist
as of the utmost importance. The state had an important interest in assuring
some permanency of a plaintiff's residence before embarking on matters of as
much consequence and delicacy as declarations of marital status, adjustment of
property rights and decisions regarding the support and custody of children, all
of which are elements of a divorce case. The Court also emphasized the state's
interest in not becoming a "divorce mill," as well as an interest that its divorce
decrees be recognized under the full faith and credit clause of article IV, section
1 of the Constitution. 2 € 7
 These concerns may qualify as "compelling
interests," for strict scrutiny purposes; however, the Court made no effort, as
Justice Marshall did in his dissenting opinion, 268
 to suggest less restrictive
means of achieving those interests.
The conclusion therefore remains tenable, if not definitive, that access to
divorce is a fundamental interest whose denial activates a strict or high-
intermediate scrutiny standard of equal protection review. Presumably, that
standard is reduced when access is delayed a reasonable period of time rather
than denied indefinitely as it was in Boddie. Presumably, as well, a state will
have an easier time justifying even temporarily delayed access to divorce if it
can relate its requirements to the unique difficulties, like full faith and credit,
posed for it by the federal system.
288 419 U.S. at 406.
2 fi 7 Id. at 406-09.
268 In his analysis of asserted justifications for the state's durational residency require-
ment, Justice Marshall suggested that the state interest in avoiding collateral attacks on its
decrees "would adequately be protected by a simple requirement of domicile — physical
presence plus intent to remain — which would remove the rigid one-year barrier while permit-
ting the State to restrict the availability of its divorce process to citizens who are genuinely its
own." Id. at 424. The accompanying footnote emphasizes the impact of a "pure" domicile test
as a less restrictive alternative under the "compelling interest" standard Justice Marshall ad-
vocated. Id. at 424 n.6.
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C. The Family After Divorce
The issues raised heretofore in this section have concerned access to the
dissolution of marriage. A more diverse set of constitutional issues concerns the
rights and responsibilities of family members as determined by courts supervis-
ing the family's dissolution. Although normally the persons directly subject to
the mandates of a divorce decree are the husband and wife, courts granting
such decrees must also account for the needs and interests of any minor
children involved. This subsection will address the incidents of divorce decrees
which most frequently raise constitutional questions, except for those issues im-
plicating concepts of jurisdiction and constitutional conflict of laws.
1. Alimony
Although the practice is by no means uniform throughout the United
States, 269 state courts in most jurisdictions have the power to include in a
divorce decree a provision requiring one of the parties to support the other.
While the institution of alimony has fallen into increasing disfavor,"° it re-
mains a component of divorce decrees with sufficient frequency to demand that
its principal constitutional problems be identified and examined.
A major issue was resolved by the Supreme Court in 1979 in Orr u. Orr. 771
At common law, the existence of a husband's duty to support his wife, and the
absence of a reciprocal obligation for the wife, led courts to impose alimony
awards only against husbands and in favor of wives."' Alabama's statutory
adoption of this gender-based distinction was challenged successfully in Orr, a
case having significant implications for other gender-based distinctions
employed by courts in the divorce process.
The On- Court purported to invoke what has become its usual low-
intermediate standard of review for classifications by gender: whether such a
classification serves important governmental objectives and is substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."' It dismissed the contention
that sufficient support was to be found in the common law disabilities of
women, since Alabama had removed those disabilities by statute. The Court
also implied that those elements of the common law which discriminated
against women were themselves unconstitutional, and thus could not provide a
sufficient basis for the compounding of invidious discrimination.'"
269 See Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297, 309-10
(1977); Foster & Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown, 13 J. FAM. L. 443, 475 (1973.74).
"° E.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308 & Commissioners' Note. See
generally M.A. GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 261-64 (1977).
27 ' 440 U.S. 268.
27 ' CLARK, supra note 121, at 448.
273 440 U.S. at 279.
274 Id. at 279 n.9.
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Justice Brennan, for the majority, was nonetheless willing to acknowledge
two possible legislative purposes which might qualify as important: providing
help for needy spouses (using sex as a proxy for need) and compensating
women for past discrimination during their marriages which arguably left them
unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world. The Court decided
that this classification, however, was not "substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." 275 Rather than concluding that sex is not a reliable proxy
for need, or that married women have not been significantly impaired by past
discrimination, Justice Brennan chose to weigh the costs to Alabama of ad-
judicative means for determining financial need or economic self-suffieiency. 276
He found that the cost of providing individualized determinations was negligi-
ble, since the state was already providing hearings in the divorce process at
which the parties' relative financial circumstances were considered. Moreover,
Justice Brennan found that the classification was not only over-inclusive but
also perverse. The gender-based classification under Alabama law did not pro-
tect poor women, who even in a gender-neutral scheme would not have had to
pay alimony. Instead, rich women with poor husbands, those least related to
the statute's purported objectives, were the primary beneficiaries of the
statute."' Justice Brennan concluded: "Where, as here, the State's compen-
satory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral
classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the bag-
gage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis
of sex. ''278
It would be premature to conclude after Orr that the Court adopted a
means test for gender-based classifications akin to the means test of high-
intermediate or strict scrutiny. The Court examined alternative means only to
the extent that such means were already in existence, but not yet directed at the
particular purpose purportedly served by the statutory classification. For ex-
ample, the Court did not demand the establishment of a new adjudicative
mechanism, as it might have under high-intermediate or strict scrutiny. 279
Nonetheless, because the divorce process in the United States has been tradi-
tionally attended by adjudicative procedures, 2" Orr has had an extensive im-
25 Id. at 280-83.
" 6 Id. at 280-81. In his analysis, Justice Brennan assumed that a gender neutral
classification would allow poor men the benefits of alimony rather than relieve rich men of its
burdens, a choice necessarily left ultimately to the Alabama political process.
2" Id. at 282-83.
"rB Id. at 283.
"' For example, the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny to a classification worked
by state durational residency requirements for the receipt of welfare benefits in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Unlike the Orr case, invalidation of the classification had the
impact of creating new litigation over matters such as the multiple receipt of welfare payments
associated with welfare fraud. In every alimony proceeding, the parties are already before the
court on the issue of divorce and their relative need is almost invariably already a subject for
judicial inquiry.
280 In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Court determined that divorces could
be legislatively granted. While this may still be good law, it is likely that a state which makes
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pact on all gender-based classifications employed in the process, as will be
discussed in later subsections.
The other constitutional issues surrounding alimony must be considered
in light of the necessary conclusion that there is no fundamental right to
alimony. Thus a state may choose never to embrace the concept; and if it does
embrace the concept, it has wide discretion in determining the conditions
under which awards should or should not be made. Therefore, while there may
be a strong argument that due process demands the availability of no-fault
divorce,"' there is no coordinate argument against the employment of fault
criteria, as such, in the granting or modification of alimony awards.
A potential constitutional issue does arise, however, when a court is re-
quested to deny or modify an alimony award because the entitled spouse is
cohabiting with a new partner or merely engaging in nonmarital sexual rela-
tions. Presumably, a court would be justified in modifying an alimony award
on the basis of the financial aspects of such a nonmarital relationship. Were
such a decision to be based wholly on the individual's sexual conduct or morali-
ty, however, a question of constitutionally protected privacy may be raised.
The court may be justified in considering such behavior where the conduct in
question predates the granting of a divorce. Indeed, it has been within the
traditional purview of a divorce court to examine allegations of adultery. There
would appear to be no claim of consequence, therefore, that constitutional
privacy extends to adulterous relationships. 282 The question remains as to
whether a court, in the course of proceedings seeking the modification of an
alimony award, may inquire into the sexual practices of a non-married party.
While the Supreme Court cases protecting contraception and abortion choices
often have been characterized in terms of privacy, 283 since Griswold v. Connect-
icii1284
 that privacy has been much more clearly identified in decisions concerned
with procreation than with freedom from physical intrusion by the state into
the arenas of sexual practices. Yet, the protection accorded non-married per-
sons with regard to contraception and abortion 285
 certainly presumes a degree
of personal freedom to engage in sexual relations which must exist in order for
some alimony awards must as a matter of due process provide hearings to divorce parties to
determine whether alimony is to be awarded in any particular case. See generally Stanley v. Il-
linois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
28'
	 text at notes 245-51 supra.
282
 Laws proscribing adultery and fornication have generally been sustained against
challenges to their constitutionality as violations of a right to privacy. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d
1338 (1972). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498.99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). But see State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333, 340 (1977); State v. Pilcher 242
N.W.2d 348, 358-59 (Iowa 1976).
2" See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Planned Parent-
hood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1976).
264
	 U.S. 479 (1965).
282 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Inel,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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the fundamental procreation interest to be asserted. While a constitutional doc-
trine can be rationalized which permits a state to ban nonmarital sexual rela-
tions, but prohibits it from banning the use of contraceptives in the conduct of
such relations, it seems likely that the Court may be prepared to expand upon
sexual privacy rights for unmarried adults. In the event that a fundamental
right to sexual privacy does exist, the state's interest in maintaining a judicial
inquiry into a party's sexual conduct in order to modify an alimony award,
would not appear to meet the strict scrutiny standards which would be applied
under the due process clause. 288
While it is clear, then, that a state may not engage in gender-based classi-
fications regarding alimony awards, it does have wide discretion in other areas
of alimony law. Indeed, unless a fundamental right to sexual privacy is
recognized, courts will remain free to investigate the most intimate details of an
individual's life when deciding whether to grant or modify an alimony award.
2. Custody and Visitation
Custody of minor children in separation or divorce proceedings"' is, in
practice, among the most contentious of litigated issues in family law. 288
 The
almost universally applied standard committed to trial courts resolving custody
disputes is that of "the best interests of the child." 289 This standard permits the
broadest exercise of judicial discretion, controlled at times only by the restric-
tions of the Constitution itself. While the Supreme Court has only spoken
directly to issues of federalism that arise in custody suits,"° its decisions in
related fields provide some guidance for the identification of individual rights
assertable in divorce custody proceedings. Preliminarily, it is useful to note the
Court's view that a parent's interest in custody of her child involves "rights far
more precious . than property rights." 28 '
a. "Best Interests of the Child" — A Constitutional Necessity?
While the "best interest of the child" standard derives principally from
state law sourees, 292 it arguably has become a rule of constitutional necessity,
based in due process. Such reasoning is based on the premise that the child has
a liberty interest in his custody, entitling him to some consideration in what is,
in a judicial forum, a dispute between his parents.
286
	 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
287 The issues in separation and divorce are sufficiently similar for constitutional pur-
poses to consider them together here under the rubric of divorce.
288
	 generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1313-50.
289
 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 121, at 572 passim; UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 402; Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 226 (Summer 1975) [hereinafter cited as Mnookin].
29° See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Ford v. Ford,
371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1953); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
291 May v, Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
292
 See generally Mnookin, supra note 289, at 236 & n.45.
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The strongest argument against constitutionalizing the "best interests"
standard would rely on the Supreme Court's 1977 decision of Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families."' In Smith, six of nine justices joined in a majority opinion
which hinted that no liberty interest was implicated when the state removed the
custody of a child from a foster family. 294 Furthermore, the remaining
members of the Court, concurring, would have been willing to hold that the
child had no protectible liberty interest. 395 The principal challenges to New
York law in Smith were, concededly, procedural, since the best interest of the
child doctrine had been adopted by New York as the appropriate substantive
criterion for custody suits. In addition, the procedures were not challenged by
children directly, but by foster parents who asserted both their own rights and
the third party rights of foster children. Still, it would be difficult to argue, after
Smith, that what did not qualify as a liberty interest for a child in a foster home,
, his custody, does qualify as such for a child of divorce. Absent such a liber-
ty interest, there would seem to be no requirement that the best interest of the
child doctrine is constitutionally mandated.
Nonetheless, Smith can and should be distinguished in order to resolve the
question. Although the Smith Court suggested that no protectible liberty in-
terest was implicated in custody suits, the majority was unwilling to answer the
question directly. Instead, the Court held that even if a protectible interest did
exist, the procedure accorded the plaintiffs had satisfied due process. 296
Moreover, even Justice Stewart, the author of the concurring opinion,
recognized that child custody decisions could not be made for whatever
reasons or for no reason at all. "297 To suggest that a child of divorce may be
"awarded" to one parent or another, as reward or punishment for their con-
duct, without regard for the child's interests, would be to treat the child as a
chattel rather than a person. Such an approach is wholly at odds with a grow-
ing body of Supreme Court authority recognizing the "personhood" of
children for the purposes of the assertion of constitutional rights. 298
If the child is recognized as having a threshold liberty interest in his
custody, it can be argued that custody should be awarded in accordance with
his best interests, absent overriding countervailing social concerns. It is an
argument less persuasive than its premise, which is that the child should be ac-
corded some due process consideration in custody suits. A child's best in-
terests, however, may be contrary to the interests of one or both of the parents.
There would seem to be nothing in the constitution demanding that a state
favor the interests of children over the interests of adults. It is suggested,
therefore, that substantive due process requires consideration of a child's best
2" 431 U.S. 816.
294 Id. at 840-42.





2" See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
999	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 22:935
interests as a factor in determining custody, but does not require it to be the
court's ultimate standard of disposition.
b. Parental Morality
If a divorce may be denied to a plaintiff on the basis of his own immorality
(e.g. , adultery or physical cruelty)299 the question arises whether a court may
rely on those same grounds to deny custody to the "blameworthy" parent. The
constitutional considerations which inhibit a court from so acting30° appear to
arise more from the rights of the child to a consideration of his best interests,
than from the rights of the parent to some sort of constitutional privacy. A
divorce court, acting as the state for fourteenth amendment purposes, plays a
considerably different role from that of state law enforcement authorities ex-
hibited in cases of marital privacy, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 ' and sexual
privacy, such as Carey v. Population Services. 302 The court does not intrude into
the intimacy of a marriage except by the invitation extended by a spouse's
presentation of evidence of a personal nature. In addition, the Supreme Court,
as noted earlier, has not applied notions of sexual privacy to prohibit judicial
recognition of an adulterous relationship. The parent's privacy rights, then, do
not prohibit the court from considering immoral conduct in custody decisions.
While a court may take into account a parent's immoral conduct, the
child's constitutionally protected interests may prevent this factor from being
dispositive in custody decisions. A child's welfare may best be served in the
custody of his adulterous, criminal, or otherwise immoral parent. Thus, a
categorical rule disqualifying a parent found morally deficient would seem to
violate the right of the child not to be deprived of liberty without due process of
law. However, since the best interests of the child need not be the exclusive
criterion for custody decisions,'" it is possible that a court might weigh more
heavily the interests of the morally blameless parent in reaching a custody
determination. It must be reiterated that divorce courts deciding custody con-
tests normally have wide discretion, and can usually relate adjudicated moral
deficiencies of one parent to the best interests of the child, thus voiding putative
constitutional claims.
Does the situation change when a noncustodial parent seeks a modifica-
tion of a custody decree on the grounds of "immoral" behavior on the part of
the custodial parent? Even if there is a general right of sexual privacy for un-
499 See text at notes 241-51 supra; see Developments, supra note 3, at 1343-45.
3" Even states which had categorical rules barring adulterous parents in a divorce action
from being awarded custody over nonadulterous parents seem to be replacing their categorical
rules with presumptions against the adulterous parents. See, e.g. , Yates v. Yates, 284 So. 2d 46
(Miss. 1973); Lockard v. Lockard, 197 Neb. 400, 227 N.W.2d 581 (1975). For an extensive
treatment of the subject, see Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CINN.
L. REV. 647 (1977).
30 ' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
302 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
909
 See generally Mnookin, supra note 289.
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married consenting adults, a highly questionable premise, 304 the state's interest
in the well-being of the child would seem sufficiently compelling to allow it to
take into account the sexual behavior of a parent. There would seem to be no
constitutional inhibition to removing custody from a parent on the basis of that
parent's "immorality," so long as the parental behavior in question could be
shown to have some detrimental impact on the child. The trial court would
likely be allowed wide discretion in finding such an impact, even if evidence to
the contrary were abundant. In this respect, due process considerations would
probably serve the purpose of encouraging articulated judicial decision-
making, rather than actually affecting the ultimate custody disposition.
While the consideration of a parent's moral character in custody decisions
does appear to raise constitutional claims of right to privacy, the role of the
court in such proceedings diminishes the odiousness of the intrusion. So long as
a court can relate a parent's relevant moral behavior to the best interests of the
child, evaluation of such conduct seems unassailable.
c. Gender-based and Racial Classifications
In the past, it was not unusual for states to establish a presumption favor-
ing maternal custody of children of broken homes, 305 at least during the child's
"tender years. 306 In light of Orr v. Orr, 307 discussed at length in the previous
subsection, 3 °8 it seems unlikely that such a gender-based presumption 308 can
withstand equal protection scrutiny. The Court in On , found that the existence of
Alabama's sex-based classification, rather than its impact, activated low-
intermediate scrutiny. Such a classification "must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."'
A presumption favoring the mother may, by the state's perception, serve
the important interest of promoting the interests of the children of divorce. But,
even assuming that a court is willing to accept that, under certain cir-
cumstances, a child's emotional development will be best served if he is in the
custody of his mother, 3 " such a presumption cannot meet the "substantial
relationship" test. As in Orr, the state already provides adjudicative
304
 See text at notes 200-05 supra.
3 ° 5 See Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262 (1976).
3 ° 0 See Jones, The Tender Years Doctrine: Survey and Analysis, 16 J. FAM. L. 695 (1978);
Roth, Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423 (1977); CLARK, supra
note 121, at 585 (1968).
307
 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
3 ° 8 See text and notes at notes 261-70 supra.
309
 It is clear under Orr that a rule or irrebuttable presumption precluding paternal
custody would be unconstitutional. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1974).
310 440 U.S. at 279.
3 " See Bradbrook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future Develop-
ment of the Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody Disputes, 11 J. FAM. L. 557,
562-79 (1971); Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969).
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mechanisms which can operate as cheaply and efficiently to determine the best
interests of the child without the operation of a gender-based presumption
which reinforces sexual stereotypes.
A presumption, which has sometimes been employed in cases of in-
dividual older children,'" is that a child will be best served by custody with a
parent of the same sex. Although such a presumption does not categorically
discriminate against members of one sex, and is not in accordance with tradi-
tional sexual stereotypes, it nonetheless appears to fail under low-intermediate
scrutiny. The presence of an adjudicative mechanism which can operate effec-
tively without gender related presumptions would again seem to be the fatal
flaw.
The parent's gender is an important factor in other aspects of custody suits
as well. For example, may a trial judge determine that the prevalence of
maternally-headed single parent households in a particular community will
create an environment where the child will have a more successful adaptation if
placed in the custody of his mother? In other words, to what extent must the
exercise of judicial discretion ignore individual psychological, social or cultural
considerations which would make gender a factor in custody determinations?
Orr v. Orr does not provide a definitive answer because the Court in that case
was dealing with a rule of law rather than an exercise of discretion. In addition,
Orr concerned a dispute solely between the husband and wife, with no jux-
taposition of children's interests to complicate matters. The Orr Court did
recognize, however, that a trial court resolving an alimony dispute may find
that discrimination against women in society may become a factor in determin-
ing the legitimacy of a wife's claim for alimony.'" Orr thus does not seem to
preclude gender considerations from influencing the disposition of individual
alimony claims, but only gender-based rules of law and presumptions.
While the distinction between gender as a presumption and gender as a
factor may be readily employed in alimony determinations, its applicability to
custody disputes is more problematical. The Orr Court's premise that findings
regarding the cultural impact of gender classifications may be legitimately con-
sidered in alimony proceedings seems justified. The ultimate facts which a
divorce court must resolve involve the financial need of the alimony claimant.
This is an area to which the courts' mechanisms are well suited. In the alimony
proceeding the factor of sex discrimination, which may be a major cause of the
woman's financial predicament, remains secondary to a finding of individual
financial need. In addition, the use of gender as a factor in determining
alimony awards is an attempt to neutralize, not perpetuate, sexual stereotypes.
In custody disputes, a trial court is dealing in the nether world of the "best
interests of the child," where judicial techniques are most suspect for their in-
ability to project accurately the impact of subtle environmental factors on the
9'2
	 e.g., CLARK, supra note 121, at 585
31 ' 440 U.S. at 281-82.
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emotional health of human beings.'" Yet a court's perception of the desirabili-
ty of maternal nurturing and the emotional needs it will serve, may become a
factor of independent, often decisive, weight in the determination of the best
interests of the child. Such a conclusion, unlike one concerning sex discrimina-
tion in an alimony dispute, cannot be rooted in independently verifiable find-
ings such as financial need. Moreover, allowing a court to act on such a percep-
tion reinforces — to a greater extent than in an alimony proceeding — the sex-
ual stereotyping which has so concerned the Supreme Court in the past.'"
Nevertheless, allowing a court to award custody of a child on the basis of the
parent's sex would seem permissible in those few instances where such a parent
could make a substantial showing that the child's unique emotional
developmental needs would be most readily met by such an arrangement,
assuming of course that other critical factors were in equipoise. The principal
differences between this kind of determination and a determination favoring
maternal nurturing, solely on the basis of sex, would be the absence of sexual
stereotyping and the reliance on individual psychological assessments, however
imprecise, rather than more ephemeral sociological or cultural pattern-finding
which is beyond judicial competency.
Presumptions determining the custody of children of an interracial mar-
riage on the basis of race, having to satisfy strict scrutiny, could of course not
survive.'" Judicial determinations about the welfare of such children in a
racially hostile society would also seem to fail strict scrutiny; a court's factfind-
ing with respect to the general relationship, between racism and emotional
health, would never seem sufficient to meet compelling interest criteria. Con-
versely, where such a finding was based on substantial psychological evidence
regarding the unique needs of the individual child, it would probably be suffi-
ciently within judicial competence to qualify as compelling, given the Supreme
Court's understandable solicitude for the perceived interest of children in
custody proceedings.'"
Custody decisions that are founded on presumptions based upon racial or
gender-based classifications seem unlikely to pass equal protection scrutiny.
Similarly, the use of race or gender as a factor in such decisions is a ques-
tionable practice. The cultural data used to support such conclusions is not of
the type easily verified by the judiciary. The practice also reinforces existing
stereotypes while ignoring the potential for individualized determinations of
3E4 See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1973); R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 476-79 (1978).
3" See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 206-07 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
1, 15 (1975).
3l6 See generally Developments, supra note 3, at 1340-43.
3 ' 7
 See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192-94 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S.
604, 608 (1958) & 609, 612 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) & 541-42 (Jackson, J., dissenting); New York ex rel. Halvey
v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947), 617-18 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) & 619 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
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the child's needs which the adjudicative process can provide. Indeed, unless
specific verifiable evidence shows that the factor of a parent's race or gender is
critical to an individual child's needs, the relevance of such factors should be
discounted.
Of course, the entire preceding discussion assumes a judicial articulation
of the role played by gender or race in making custody awards. Absent such ar-
ticulation, a party seeking to challenge an award would probably have to
establish a discriminatory pattern or practice in the operation of a particular
court or trial judge, a burden most difficult to meet. 319
d. Religion as a Factor
A frequently disputed issue in custody battles is the religious upbringing of
the child. The primary issues of constitutional dimension here are (1) the ex-
tent to which the court may take religion into account in determining custody,
and (2) having determined custody, the extent to which a court may impose
religious conditions on the custodial parent without running afoul of the
establishment or free exercise clauses of the first amendment. 39
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Yoder v. Wisconsin 320 established for
parents an interest in the religious upbringing of their children protected by the
free exercise clause. Yoder provides little assistance, however, where parents are
in conflict over this issue. It is clear that a court may not prefer the religious
convictions of one parent over another"' without running afoul of the
establishment clause. It is also clear, however, that where a child is sufficiently
mature to express a custodial preference for one of his parents based upon their
religious beliefs or observance, a court may honor that preference without of-
fending the establishment clause."' Indeed, it may be argued that to deny the
"4 For the constitutional burden of establishing racial and gender-based classifications,
see Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
"9 The religion clauses of the first amendment are binding on the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause); see
Developments, supra note 3, at 1338-40.
320 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
321 E.g. , Harris v. Harris, 343 So. 2d 762 (Miss, 1977); Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190,
367 P.2d 230 (1961) (en banc); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 278, 132 A.2d 420
(1957). See generally United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). For cases where
the choice is between religion and atheism see, e.g. , Wilson v. Wilson, 473 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1970);
Welker v. Welker, 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964). See generally Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961).
322 See Hehman v. Hehman, 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1958); Scanlon v.
Scanlon, 29 N.J. Super. 317, 102 A.2d 656 (1954) (where mother raised constitutional challenge
to placement of child in Catholic orphanage, which placement was consistent with child's
religious preference, court noted that preferences may be considered and upheld placement in or-
phanage); Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419 (1953); In re Vardinakis, 160
Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.S. 355 (1936).
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mature and sincere child the effectuation of that preference would be to violate
his right to the free exercise of religion. 323
Religion, in practice, of course, may provide more than a set of theoretical
beliefs, but a style of life. Where the stability or instability of the child's en-
vironment with one parent can be attributed in large part to that parent's
religious practices, a court must tread carefully in order to avoid adopting a set
of religious values. In recognizing the right of Amish parents to remove their
children from schooling at the age of 14, the Yoder Court emphasized the law-
abiding character of Amish culture. 324 But the Yoder Court was not confronted
with the graphic conflict of two sets of religious practices or beliefs that a
divorce proceeding provides, and therefore was probably less concerned that its
words would effect an establishment of the Amish religion. The question re-
mains as to whether a court may determine that a child is better served by a
parent who will provide a formal education past the age of 14 rather than by
one whose religious conviction forbids it. It is submitted that so long as a court
is able to frame neutral principles based on secular values demonstrably em-
braced by the legal system, it may act on those principles in determining
custody, even where the effect of its action is to reject the religious basis for one
parent's lifestyle.
Other factors may play a role in the Court's decision as well. Assume, for
example, that the parents had entered into a pre-nuptial agreement which pro-
vided that the children of the marriage be raised in a particular religion.
Presumably, such a covenant would never be specifically enforced by a court
since such action would violate both the establishment and free exercise
clauses. 325 But, might the court favor the parent who would honor such an
agreement over the parent who would not? Arguably, recognizing an arrange-
ment whereby the parties' agreement could be effectuated would be less offen-
sive to both clauses, and would not entangle the Court in enforcing the con-
tract's provisions. 326 No less persuasive is the proposition that a court's in-
capacity to enforce the contract, for constitutional reasons, carries with it the
523 "[T]he Free Exercise Clause . 	 . recognizes the value of religious training,
teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his
own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state." Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Comment, Adjudicating What Yoder Left Unresolved: Religious Rights of Minor Children, After Dan-
forth and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1978).
324 406 U.S. at 222 & n.11,
3 " State action which forces or coerces individuals to adopt a belief or position that is
contrary to their own determination has been held violative of the first amendment. Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). Judicial enforcement of private agreements having the same effect would constitute state
action. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
326 To avoid running afoul of the first amendment, the government's action must have a
secular purpose and a primarily secular effect. Also, the government's involvement must not
amount to an "excessive entanglement" with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671, 674 (1970); Nowak, The Supreme Court,
the Religion Clauses, and The Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw U.L. REV. 883, 885-86 (1976).
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requirement that the court not purposefully effect indirectly that which it could
not effect by specific enforcement.
Conflicting religious beliefs of parents also raise questions of conditions to
be placed upon the custodial parent. The non-custodial parent possesses no ob-
vious rights with respect to his child's religious training or observance. But
may a court in reconciling conflict impose religious training or observance on
the custodial parent, or restrict the non-custodial parent from religious training
or observance inconsistent with the wishes of the custodial parent during visita-
tion periods? The normal practice in state courts has been to leave the religious
upbringing of a child wholly within the hands of the custodial parent. 327
 The
possibility of a court becoming entangled in the administration of an order con-
cerning the religious upbringing of a child3 " may be sufficient reason to
recognize the general rule as a constitutional necessity under the establishment
clause. Once having established the right of the custodial parent to control
religious upbringing, there would be less reason for a court to avoid enforcing
the wishes of the custodial parent. A non-custodial parent who sought to in-
troduce inconsistent religious training or practices to the child could justifiably
be denied visitation rights without the court becoming entangled in establish-
ment clause problems. In a divided custody situation, a court would seem to
have the power to demand a negotiated agreement between the parties concern-
ing religious upbringing as a condition to approving the relationship. It would
have considerably more difficulty in designating one parent to be in charge of
religious upbringing; and it would probably impose nothing more complex of
its own making because of establishment clause considerations.
While a court cannot base a custody decision on its preference of one
parent's religion over the other's, it may be possible that the lifestyle imposed
by one religion could be viewed by a court as contrary to the best interests of
the child. If secular values form the basis for such a decision, it may be valid.
Decisions regarding the religious upbringing of the child after the divorce seem
best left in the hands of the custodial parent.
e. Visitation
In an important book written in 1973, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit sug-
gested that a "noncustodial parent should have no legally enforceable right to
visit the child."'" This position has been widely criticized as a matter of
policy, 330
 and the question of whether a non-custodial parent has constitu-
327 See, e.g., Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 602 P.2d 1279 (1979); Pardue v. Pardue,
285 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 1973); Esposito v. Esposito, 41 N.J. 143, 195 A.2d 295 (1963)
(dictum); Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 137 A.2d 618 (1958).
328 See note 326 supra.
329
 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 38 (1973).
"° See, e.g., Foster, Book Review, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 545, 550-51 (1976); Strauss &
Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 996, 1002 (1974); Dembitz, Book Review, 83 YALE
L.J. 1304, 1310 (1974).
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tionally protected visitation rights remains open. It is submitted that such a
constitutional right should be recognized. The parent's right to visitation
should be overcome only by an important, if not compelling, state interest, to
wit, the service of the best interests of the child. If, as the Supreme Court sug-
gested in May v. Anderson, the removal of children from the custody of their
mother implicates "[r]ights far more precious to [her] than property rights," 331
then surely the denial of the interest in visiting one's children stands higher on
the constitutional spectrum than the normal range of liberty and property in-
terests whose deprivation is tested under a minimum rationality standard. In
1977, in Moore v. East Cleveland, 332 the Supreme Court applied a low-
intermediate scrutiny standard to a grandmother's substantive due process
claim to be allowed to live in the same household with two of her grand-
children. A parent's claim to visitation would seem at least as strong.
Of course, it might be argued that a state could absolve itself of all consti-
tutional responsibility for such matters by awarding custody to one parent and
allowing that parent to decide all visitation questions. But the custodial parent
ultimately would have to rely upon a court for enforcement of rights claimed
under law. Consequently, under the Supreme Court's state action eases"' the
application of constitutional standards would be required in order to deny
visitation to a non-custodial parent.
A recognition of this presumptive right of visitation is not to calcify an in-
variable result. A divorce court would merely have to conclude on all the
evidence that such visitation was not in the child's best interests in order to
satisfy a constitutional standard of substantial relationship to an important
state interest. When a New Jersey Court concluded that "the fact that one of
the parents is a homosexual does not per se provide sufficient basis for the
deprivation of visitation rights," 3 " it was acting in accordance with in-
termediate scrutiny standards. Even the important purpose of protecting the
best interests of children could not justify a rule so tenuously related to that
purpose, and in any event so overinclusive. Yet the same court's order that the
defendant father "not cohabit or sleep with any individual other than a lawful
spouse; . . . [or] . . • involve the children in any homosexual related ac-
tivities or publicity," 335
 during periods of visitation, was also constitutionally
justifiable, because it was more narrowly drawn. While the father's rights to
associate freely and to engage in political activity on behalf of gay rights were
themselves worthy of constitutional protection under the first amendment, they
could be reasonably limited — although not categorically denied — to reconcile
them both to his right to visitation and the service of the best interests of his
children.
"' 345 U.S. 328, 533 (1953).
331 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
333 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"* In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974), aff'd, 142 N.J. Super. 499,
362 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976).
"' Id. at 498, 324 A.2d at 97.
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Other constitutional claims have been raised in situations where the
decrees providing visitation rights to non-custodial parents have, in order to
protect such visitation rights, limited the rights of custodial parents to travel ex-
tensively with their children or to move their permanent residence. 336 Relying
on equal protection cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson, 337
 Dunn v. Blurnstein, 338
and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 339 claimants can argue that a classifi-
cation which burdens a fundamental interest, such as interstate travel or in-
terstate removal of residence, must be tested by strict scrutiny standards. The
problem posed involves the most difficult questions of policy for a court seeking
to serve reasonably the interests of both the parents and the child, but it would
appear that the constitutional basis for demanding unrestricted travel and
choice of residence for the custodial parent is insufficient to invalidate such
restrictions.
The principal cases relied upon by custodial parents are distinguishable
since they involve either "necessities of life," 340
 or a second fundamental in-
terest, such as the interest in voting advanced in Dunn. Absent more, residence
requirements simply do not create a prima facie case for the application of strict
scrutiny standards."' Further, even if strict scrutiny were applied, the ex-
istence of a fundamental interest in visitation for the non-custodial parent, as
hypothesized earlier, should suffice to justify a court's identification of that in-
terest as "compelling" enough to warrant the restriction on trave1. 342 Con-
versely, a supportable judicial finding that allowing the custodial parent to
move to a different state or foreign country will serve the best interests of the
child should be sufficient to answer the contentions of a non-custodial parent
that his right to visitation has been violated by the removal of his child.
One other putative constitutional claim concerning visitation deserves
mention. A number of states, by statute"' and judicial decision, 344 have
"6 E.g., Ryan v. Ryan, 300 Minn. 244, 251-52, 219 N.W.2d 912, 917 (1974); Ex parte
Rhodes, 163 Tex. 31, 34, 352 S.W.2d 249, 250 (1961). See Comment, Restrictions on a Parent's
Right to Travel In Child Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 181
(1973).
"' 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
98 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
3"
 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
"° The Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County emphasized the importance of
medical care as a "necessity of life." 415 U.S. at 259-61 & nn.14, 15.
34 ' See, e.g., Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976).
342
 The Supreme Court's decision upholding state residency requirements for parties
Wishing to institute divorce proceedings, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), is not relevant
here. In Sosna, the Court upheld the state's interest in the integrity of its judicial processes against
the individual rights of family choice asserted by the parties wishing to obtain a divorce. While
the present situation is similar in that it too focuses on an individual right to family choice, it is
unlikely that a third-party interest in visitation, advanced by the state, is as strong as the integrity
of judicial processes was found to be in Sosna.
1 " For examples of statutes providing for grandparental visitation rights, and the cir-
cumstances under which they are granted, see CAL. Civ. CODE S 197.5 (West Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 5 9:2:7.1 (West 1976); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 72 (McKinney 1977); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, 5 14.03(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
3" See, e.g., Boyles v. Boyles, 14 Ill. App. 3d 602, 302 N.E.2d 199 (1973).
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established a right of visitation for grandparents. Prior to Moore v. Ease
Cleveland,'" the thought of according this right constitutional status would'have
been wholly untenable. Moore established the right of grandparents to live
together with their grandchildren without interference by the state. In Moore,
however, there was no nuclear parent-child family in existence. Hence, it
would be vastly overreading Moore to conclude that it establishes a categorical
visitation right for grandparents. The argument for a constitutional right to
visitation by grandparents would be much stronger, for example, were both
parents deceased and the grandchildren in foster care.
Constitutional issues, then, lurk behind almost every aspect of decisions
regarding child custody and visitation rights after divorce. In custody battles,
courts may be required constitutionally to consider the best interests of the
child as a factor in the ultimate decision. When considering other factors, such
as the moral character, gender, and religion of each parent, courts must tread
cautiously to avoid violating the free exercise clause, the establishment clause,
and individual rights to privacy. In addition, courts must be cognizant of the
parent's presumptive right to visitation when determining post-divorce condi-
tions best suited to the interests of the children.
3. Child Support
By statute,'" if not by common law, 347 parents normally have an obliga-
tion to support their children. This obligation extends to married, unmarried,
and divorced parents. Most of the law of child support, however, arises in a
divorce context, as do the principal constitutional issues. Nonetheless, the pres-
ent discussion is also relevant to constitutional questions regarding child sup-
port which may arise absent divorce.
Historically, parental support obligations tended to be imposed only upon
fathers, 3" but during this century, many states extended a subordinate support
obligation to mothers. 349 State court decisions striking down the gender-based
classification imposing support obligations only upon fathers as violative of
3 " 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
346 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE 55 196, 206 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. 5 74-105
(1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 227 (West 1952); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 32 (McKinney
Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 3103.03 (Baldwin 1976).
347 See, e.g., In re Custody of Miller, 86 Wash, 2d 712, 719, 548 P.2d 542, 546 (1976); In
re Estate of Peterson, 66 Wis. 2d 535, 540, 225 N.W.2d 644, 646 (1975); Ex parte Holloway, 490
S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Lynch v. Ambruster, 7 Ohio App. 2d 1, 2, 218 N.E.2d
624, 625 (1966). See generally CLARK, supra note 121, at 488; S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 9
(1971); Goodman, Oberman & Wheat, Rights and Obligations of Child Support, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 36
(1975).
349 CLARK, supra note 121, at 189, 488.89; J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 654 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AREEN]; Recent Developments: Conway v. Dana, 10
TULSA L. J. 485, 486-87 (1975); Case Note, Domestic Relations: The Expanding Role of the Mother in
Child Support, 27 ARK. L. REV. 157, 157-58 (1973).
"9 See, e.g., O'Leary v. Porter, 42 Wis. 2d 491, 167 N.W.2d 193 (1969); Stargell v.
Stargell, 263 Cal. App. 2d 504, 69 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1968). See generally AREEN, supra note 348, at
654; Case Note, Domestic Relations: The Expanding Role of the Mother in Child Support, 27 ARK. L.
REV. 157, 158-59 (1973).
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equal protection"° would appear vindicated by the Supreme Court's 1979
decision in Orr v. Orr."' There is no greater justification for basing child sup-
port obligations on a gender-linked presumption than there is for alimony. As
in the case of alimony, even the administrative expediency rationale fails where
an adjudicative mechanism is already provided for assessing the financial
capabilities of the parties.
The unconstitutionality of gender-based distinctions between recipients of
child support was more directly addressed by the Supreme Court in Stanton v.
Stanton. 352 In Stanton, a state statute required parents to support their sons until
they reached the age of twenty-one, but only required support for daughters up
to the age of eighteen. The Court found that the gender classification worked
by the Utah statute in issue could not meet the strict rationality test which the
Court had adopted for sex-based classifications four years earlier. 353
 Given the
state's burden to adduce a plausible relationship to a legitimate objective,
Justice Blackmun found "nothing rational" 334 in the suggestion that the dif-
ferential age was justified by the greater educational needs of males in our
society and the earlier maturity of females. 355 Statutes which categorically im-
pose support obligations only upon fathers would appear to be equally lacking
in rationality.
Another set of constitutional questions arises when the economic status of
the obligated parent undergoes a significant change. Such changed financial
circumstances are normally sufficient to justify modification in the existence or
extent of child support awards. A parent not involved in a divorce action may
presumably change jobs, retire, or otherwise reduce his standard of living, ir-
respective of the material or educational deprivations such a decision may
cause his children. Yet some courts have held that the amount of support
payments will not be reduced when a parent obligated under a support order
makes occupational choices reducing his resources. 356 Even if judicial responses
to such decisions were put in prohibitory terms, which they virtually never are,
it is unlikely that the interest in changing occupations, or ceasing to work at all,
"° E.g. , Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 435, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Carole K. v.
Arnold K., 85 Misc. 2d 643, 380 N.Y.S.2d, 593, modified on other grounds, 87 Misc. 2d 547, 385
N.Y.S.2d 740 (Fam. Ct. 1976). Other courts have struck down the placement of a primary sup-
port obligation exclusively on the father as a violation of the equal status of men and women
under a state constitutional equal rights amendment. E.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
"' 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
352 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
"3 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The current standard for gender-based
classifications is discussed at text and in note 28 supra.
354 421 U.S. at 14.
2" The Court remanded to the Utah courts for a determination of which age, eighteen
or twenty-one, was to be considered the age of majority for child support purposes. The case then
had another round in the Supreme Court in Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (per curiam).
"6 E.g., In re Marriage of McKeever, 36 Or. App. 19, 583 P.2d 30 (1978); Curtis v.
Curtis, 448 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Reed v. Reed, 260 Iowa 1166, 152 N.W.2d 190
(1967); Austin v. Austin, 308 Mich. 139, 13 N.W.2d 237 (1944).
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is sufficiently fundamental to warrant extraordinary protection under substan-
tive due process. 357 Concerns for the welfare of the children would seem to be
more than sufficient to justify such restrictions under minimum rationality.
The argument that equal protection principles are violated by imposing upon
divorced parents occupational restrictions not imposed on the non-divorced is a
more appealing one. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to justify review on a
standard more rigorous than minimal rationality, so long as there is no fun-
damental interest in occupational choice, 358 and the classification based on
marital status remains non-suspect. 359 Under minimum rationality an equal
protection claim would probably fare no better than a due process challenge.
Occupational change is not the only financial factor which can lead an
obligated parent to seek withdrawal or downward modification of his support
obligations. Frequently, remarriage and the advent of a second family increase
financial burdens. Many courts have held that such changed circumstances do
not justify the modification of previously determined child support awards. 36 °
While, again, the resultant limitations on the conduct of the parent are not
often cast in prohibitory terms, they do suggest claims of constitutional viola-
tion having considerably more substance than do decisions based on occupa-
tional change.
To begin, the obligated parent may claim that a court, in defeating the
practical option of remarriage and the birth of additional children, is penalizing
the exercise of a fundamental right or interest in decisions concerning marriage
and procreation. It is, of course, true that any financial obligation privately in-
curred and judicially enforced may have the practical impact of limiting in-
dividual choices regarding marriage and procreation, but the fundamental in-
terest analysis does seem to possess some merit when the obligation being en-
forced is to children of a first marriage in preference to children of a second.
The principal support for such an argument comes from Zablocki v.
Redhai1, 36 ' which struck down a Wisconsin statute prohibiting any non-
custodial parent with outstanding child support obligations from marrying
without judicial permission. Under the statute such permission could only be
granted upon the applicant's proof of compliance with the support obligation
377 See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954);
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
3 " In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), the Court
refused to apply a higher level of scrutiny than that called for by the rational basis test in con-
sidering a challenge to compulsory retirement rules. The Court did not recognize the claim of the
appellee to his occupation as having any type of "fundamental" status. For analysis and com-
mentary, see Abramson, Compulsory Retirement, The Constitution, and the Murgia Case, 42 Mo. L.
REV. 25 (1977).
"' See text at notes 49-51, 76-77.
3" E.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); Rowley v. Rowley,
232 Or. 285, 375 P.2d 84 (1962); Beaird v. Beaird, 380 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964);
Shipley v. Shipley, 175 Neb. 119, 120 N.W.2d 582 (1963).
3e1 434 U.S. 374 (1978). For a fuller discussion of case, see text at notes 112-14 supra.
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and demonstration that the recipients were not likely to become public charges.
Finding that the statute intruded on a fundamental interest, 362 the Court
employed a high-intermediate standard of review requiring that such a statute,
to pass constitutional muster, be supported by "important state interests and
. . . closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. " 963 Application of that
standard to a categorical refusal by courts to reduce or withdraw child support
awards for obligated parents who undertake the obligations of a new family,
might result in the invalidation of such restrictions. In any event, the policy
surely could not satisfy the means component of the test if the restriction had
the effect of maintaining a luxurious lifestyle for the first family while leaving a
second family at a mere subsistence level of existence.
Nonetheless, however unwise the policy may seem, it would be difficult to
conclude that a refusal to modify support obligations violates the constitutional
rights of affected parents. Unlike the situation in Zablocki, the restriction is not
totally prohibitory. Moreover, a judicial refusal to modify a child support
award, however inconsistent with judicial responses to other changes in finan-
cial circumstances, should not be regarded as infringement upon a fundamen-
tal interest. A court is not arbitrarily choosing between two sets of children to
which the obligated parent has equal privacy interests. The privacy of his rela-
tionship with the children of the first family has already been substantially and
legitimately broken down by the need for the invocation of legal machinery to
establish the child support obligation. Enforcement of child support obligations
can no more be viewed as a penalty on a fundamental interest than can a judg-
ment in favor of a credit company which also acts to discourage the creation of
a new family.
The children of the second family also have interests at stake. It could be
argued that a state policy which creates a second-class status for such children
by diverting family's resources to their parent's previous family establishes a
classification in violation of their rights under the equal protection clause. Such
a policy would seem unable to survive any more rigorous a standard of review
than minimum rationality. The problem, then, is to establish the grounds,
either under interest or classification analysis, to lift their claim beyond a
minimum scrutiny level. This is problematical. Apparently even the interest in
maintaining a subsistence level of existence does not qualify for heightened
scrutiny. 364 However appealing the "accident of birth" argument may be as an
attack on the classification between children of the first and second families, an
insufficient history of discrimination against the disfavored class, in addition to
their political powerlessness vis-a-vis the favored class, 363 probably prevents
362
 434 U.S. at 383.
363 Id. at 388.
364 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
365 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976); San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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such children from being accorded even the "quasi-suspect" status which sex-
based classifications receive. 366
The law of child support, then, raises a varied group of constitutional
issues. Clearly, guidelines regarding responsibility for support cannot be based
solely on a parent's sex. Once support payments are imposed, the obligated
parent may find that liberties others enjoy, such as changing careers, or start-
ing new families, may be legitimately restricted directly or indirectly, by the
state.
There are additional issues in the law of child support where constitutional
claims may be asserted. These include, for example, the imposition of support
obligations for the higher education of children, support of adult children, and
the responsibilities of stepparents or paramours. 367
 But it would appear that
such constitutional violations raise issues' of substantive due process which
must be treated with minimum scrutiny analysis. The claims, therefore, would
normally be constitutionally groundless.
D. Discrimination Against the Divorced
Marital status has never been acknowledged as a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification. The leading Supreme Court case on the question of discrimina-
tion against the divorced is Mathews v. DeCastro, 368 decided in 1976. Under at-
tack in that case was section 202(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, which provid-
ed benefits to married women under the age of 62, who had minor or depend-
ent children in their care, upon the retirement or disability of their husbands.
The statute excluded from its benefits divorced women similarly situated until
they reached the age of 62. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart,
employed a traditional minimum rationality standard in sustaining the
classification. 369 The Court noted:
Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the economic and
personal relationship between a husband and wife. Ordinarily it
means they will go their separate ways. and could have ra-
tionally assumed that divorced husbands and wives depend less on
each other for financial and other support than do couples who stay
married . . . For instance, a divorced wife need not forego work in
order to stay at home to care for her disabled husband. She may not
feel the pinch of the extra expenses accompanying her former hus-
band's old age or disability. In short, divorced couples typically live
separate lives. It was not irrational for Congress to recognize this
basic fact in deciding to defer monthly payments to divorced wives of
retired or disabled wage earners until they reach the age of 62. 370
366 See note 25 supra.
367 E.g., Washington Statewide Org. of Stepparents v. Smith, 85 Wash. 2d 564, 536
P.2d 1202 (1974) (en Banc).
368 429 U.S. 181 (1976).
369 Id. at 188-89.
"° Id. at 188-89.
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The Court was thus willing to engage in extensive speculation about possible
rationales for the classification. It did not purport to inquire whether a more
narrowly drawn classification might have substantially achieved the same ob-
jectives."' The status of divorce, then, seems most assuredly non-suspect.
The alternative arguments for the unconstitutionality of discrimination
against the divorced must necessarily employ an interest analysis. As discussed
earlier, however, the arguments for a fundamental right to or interest in
divorce derive primarily from the right to or interest in marital choice."'
Employing an interest analysis, classifications penalizing divorce would thus
seem no more constitutionally vulnerable than those penalizing marriage.
Mathews v. DeCastro, then, is consistent with both the standard employed and
the result reached in Califano v. joint."' jobst sustained a classification under
the Social Security Act which terminated benefits for certain disabled
beneficiaries upon marriage. The Court employed a minimum rationality
standard, and, in reasoning similar to that used in DeCastro, rejected the argu-
ment that a fundamental interest in marital choice required the invocation of
strict scrutiny.
Nonetheless, these cases denying governmental benefits may not be fully
dispositive of all classifications discriminating against the divorced. For exam-
ple, could a state disqualify from public employment as social workers or mar-
riage counselors all divorced persons, on the minimally rational grounds that
those unable to maintain their own family units will frequently have problems
in helping others achieve stability? This article suggests that penalties on the
interest in divorce should be reviewed under a strict rationality standard —
"fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" — similar to the
one employed by an Indiana state court in striking down a rule penalizing mar-
riage. 374 Such a standard would not change the result of cases such as DeCastro,
but would limit the government's ability to penalize persons who, frequently
without fault, or even choice, became divorced.
CONCLUSION
The past two decades have witnessed the significant constitutionalization
of marriage and divorce, subjects historically considered the nearly exclusive
concern of state law. The Supreme Court has recognized new protectible rights
and interests associated with marriage and divorce under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Yet it is dif-
ficult to identify with confidence conceptually clear lines delineating emergent
constitutional values. The next two decades should give the Court the oppor-
tunity to solidify and clarify the relationship between constitutional limitations
on government and individual interests in marriage and divorce.
3 " Id. at 185-89.
372 See text at notes 212-13 & 257-59 supra.
73 434 U.S. 47 (1977). For a discussion of jobst see text at notes 168-72 supra.
94 Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 164 Ind. App. 169, 179, 329 N.E.2d
66, 73 (1975).
